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Preface 
This publication “Feasibility Studies and Public Regulation in a Market 
Economy” is to be used in module 4 and 5 in the PROCEED programme, 
which is a training programme for Energy Experts in the Baltic States. The 
PROCEED programme is financed by the Nordic Council of Ministers. 
The material has a general character, and is to be used in connection with the 
case material developed in each of the Baltic countries. 
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 Chapter 1 
Market Institutions  
and Technological Change 
1.1 The Consequences of Changing Conditions 
Feasibility studies include both design of feasible technical alternatives and 
an evaluation of social, environmental and economic costs of those 
alternatives. In socioeconomic feasibility studies the question is, whether a 
project is feasible for the society as a whole, whereas in business feasibility 
studies it is analysed, whether a project is feasible for a specific company. 
 
Coherent technical descriptions of alternative ways of achieving certain 
energy policy goals can be established by the use of computer models such 
as SESAM and KVDESIGN. From such alternative strategies the purpose of 
a socioeconomic feasibility study is to find the best solutions under the 
combination of present and prognosticated conditions. The purpose of public 
regulation studies is to identify and develop the best set of means for the 
implementation of the most feasible strategy. Figure 1.1 summarises the 
content of socioeconomic and public regulation studies as well as the 
relationship between those two areas of study. 
 
 1) Design of 
alternatives 
2) Socioeconomic  
analysis of alternatives 
3) Socio- 
economic 
feasibility 
studies 
Establishment of 
technical scenarios 
and technical 
alternatives. 
Finding the best solution from an 
analysis of economical, environmental, 
political and social feasibility. 
4) Public 
regulation      
studies 
Establishment of 
Implementation 
scenarios or 
alternatives. 
Forming a strategy of implementation 
from an analysis of economical, 
environmental, political and social 
feasibility of implementation strategies. 
Figure 1.1:   Socioeconomic feasibility Studies and Public Regulation. 
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It should be emphasized, that both feasibility- and public regulation studies 
have to be placed in a historical context. This implies, for instance, that in 
periods of massive technological and institutional changes, feasibility- and 
public regulation studies have to include thorough analysis of the 
consequences and possibilities of such changes. In the present situation in 
both Denmark and the Baltic countries feasibility and public regulation 
studies therefore must include a description of the character of the 
technological and institutional context. 
 
 
1.2 The Character of Technological Change 
The existing energy system is characterized by at the one hand often large 
electricity and heat supply companies, and at the other hand many 
differentiated consumers divided into households and public and private 
enterprises.  
 
The existing supply system is characterised by 
- single purpose companies, i.e. enterprises which have production and/or 
sale of energy services as their only purpose. 
- being sectorized in heat systems, electricity systems, natural gas 
systems, etc. 
-  having investments that are capital intensive and almost 100% asset 
specific. By asset specificity is meant, that the assets, district heating 
systems, power stations, power grids, etc. can only be used for their 
present purposes. 
-  having investments in equipment with a very long technical lifetime, 
often 20-40 years. 
-  often being organisationally linked to fossil fuel-based systems. 
-  being consolidated from a capital point of view. 
-  being consolidated from a political point of view. 
 
The existing consumers’ system is characterised by 
-  many multipurpose organisations, by which is meant, that the 
households, and private or public firms have other main purposes, than 
for instance investing in electricity and heat conservation. 
-  organisations with a lack of capital for investing in energy conservation 
activities. 
-  having no common organization of the electricity- and heat conservation 
activities. 
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The necessary technological changes cannot be implemented by “end of 
pipe” solutions such as for instance rebuilding the existing energy system by 
building better power plants, undertaking smoke pollution abatement 
measures and building heat pumps for electrical heating. Such solutions are 
not sufficient when wanting to decrease for instance the CO2 emissions by 
50%-80% within a period of 20-40 years. Conservative “end of pipe” 
solutions are not even sufficient for countries who find it necessary just to 
make their existing energy systems function.  
 
The existing energy system shall naturally function from a technical point of 
view, but at the same time it is necessary to keep the innovative perspective 
alive. If countries with very scarce financial resources undertake a very 
defensive attitude towards participating in the needed technological 
innovation processes at the energy scene, they will stay behind in the 
technological development process, and continue to be dependant receivers 
and not developers of new technology. It therefore is necessary to be able to 
discuss solutions which go beyond the short term "end of pipe" thinking. 
The implementation of such solutions demands not only technical changes 
but also changes in organisation, knowledge, infrastructures etc. 
 
In order to localize the need for institutional changes, it therefore is 
necessary to establish long term technical scenarios. Such scenarios have 
been developed in several countries within the last 20 years, and they all end 
up with the following main groups of technologies: 
(a)  Energy conservation technologies within heat as well as electricity at 
the consumer level. 
(b)  Renewable energy systems, e.g. wind generators, biomass energy, wave 
generators, direct solar energy, etc. 
(c)  Improved efficiency of supply systems, which are based on fossil fuels 
(including uranium). Essentially is the change to co-production of 
electrical power and heat in DCHP systems (Decentralized Combined 
Heat and Power production). 
 
These are the technological categories, which have been included in official 
Danish Energy Plans such as "Energy 2000" (Ministry of Energy, 1990) and 
"Energy 21 " (Ministry of Energy, 1996). Those plans show how CO2 
emissions in Denmark can be reduced by at least 20% before the year 2005, 
and 50% before 2030. 
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As opposed to the old technologies such as coal-fired power stations, the 
above mentioned new technologies are being widely distributed throughout 
the geographical areas of consumption, and the implementation is therefore 
characterised by the following: 
- The technical solutions will differ from one place to another and 
sometimes new, partly unsafe and not well-proved technologies will 
have to be implemented. The maintenance of such new technologies will 
depend on ownership and organisation. Along with the implementation 
of new technologies it is therefore likely that new types of organisations 
will evolve. Maintenance of biogas plants and straw-fired district 
heating systems have already brought about new organisations in which 
corporations of farmers own one part of the plants while corporations of 
district heating consumers own the other part. 
- Investments will have to be carried out by multipurpose organisations. 
Thus, electricity savings will have to be implemented by private 
households and industries with only little awareness of electricity 
consumption and with quite different main objectives than producing or 
consuming electricity. This has to be compared with the former situation 
in which investments in supply technologies were carried out by single 
purpose organisations such as utility companies and gas supply 
companies with energy production as the main objective. 
- The technologies will have to be implemented by many mutually 
independent organisations. Again this has to be compared with the 
former situation of a limited number of utility companies. 
- The financial capital of these new organisations will often be 
comparatively scarce in relation to the financial capital of the fossil fuel 
supply companies. 
- The political capital of these new organisations will be relatively scarce, 
compared with the existing fossil fuel companies. 
 
All together, the technological change can be seen as a change from 
undifferentiated solutions implemented by few single-purpose organisations 
to differentiated solutions implemented by many multipurpose organisations 
(Hvelplund, 1995). And this rather radical change in technology is a 
challenge to Public Regulation. The character of this challenge can be shown 
by figure 1.2. 
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The above-mentioned characteristics of the needed technological innovation 
at the energy scene require the following political and institutional 
capabilities of change: 
 
(a) The capability to cross the boundary between the supply system and the 
consumers' system in order to make the consumers cope with the 
dynamics of the suppliers. 
(b) The capability to escape from fossil fuel systems, and to replace these 
with renewable energy sources. 
(c) The capability to break with the mono structure of electricity supply and 
enter a combined district heating and power supply (co-generation) 
structure. 
(d)  The capability to cross the boundary between the short term optimizing 
of existing technological systems, and the long term development of 
new technological systems. 
 
Consumers/
Voters
DistributionPower
Plant
Heat Supply System
(a)   Border to Heat System
Electricity Supply System
(b)   Border to Renewable Energy System
Renewable Energy System
(c)   Border to Consumers
’
 System
SUPPLY SYSTEM CONSUMPTION SYSTEM
 
Figure 1.2:  The “spatial” boundaries that energy systems must be able to 
cross. The figure shows the supply system and the consumer system, and the 
borderline (c) between those two main systems. It also shows the borderline 
between the heat and electricity system (a), and the borderlines (b) between 
the renewable energy supply system and the fossil fuel-based energy supply 
systems. 
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In order to transcend the above borderlines technically, it is necessary to 
establish institutions that make the crossing of the line possible. Politically 
this has always in Denmark been done in a process of conflicts. The 
borderlines, around existing institutional and organizational settings, cannot 
be crossed by the settings themselves. One cannot expect that an electricity 
company which is accustomed to building and use large coal-fired plants 
will initiate the introduction of DCHP plants or electricity saving programs, 
when the consequence is that part of the companies employees will be fired, 
and the total turnover of the company will decrease. The existing power 
companies have their comparative technological advantage within the 
centralized coal plant technology, and a change to DCHPs will be a change 
to a technology where this comparative advantage does not exist, neither 
technologically nor organisationally. Therefore such a change is risky for the 
existing power companies and it could be expected that they have a tendency 
to use their power to avoid such a transition. 
 
 
1.3 The Character of Market Institutions  
Every market economy is formed by a number of market institutions. In 
Neoclassical economy those institutions are often regarded static and non 
changeable. But in the case of implementation of technological change 
changes in market institutions are needed. 
 
Neoclassical Economy 
Neoclassical economy is based on the concept of a free market. The "free 
market" in the sense described by Adam Smith requires among others the 
following institutional preconditions: 
- Many mutual independent suppliers of a product. 
- Many mutual independent buyers of a product. 
- Full information regarding quality and prices of products at the market. 
- Agents at the market, with rational behaviour. 
- Sellers that maximize profits and buyers maximizing utility. 
 
When these and other conditions are fulfilled, it is argued, that the market is 
a democratic place, where the free and rational buyers with full information 
about their opportunities, by means of their money notes, are buying 
("voting " upon ) the goods which they want. Therefore, when the above 
mentioned institutional preconditions are present, the outcome of the market 
process is based upon the "votes" of free voters with full information, and 
any interference into this free market "voting" process is regarded as 
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undemocratic. It is worthwhile to emphasise, that a "free market" is not a 
market without public intervention, but a market where the public regulation 
in some decisive way acts to establish and maintain the institutional 
preconditions of the free market. 
 
Most market economies are mixed economies consisting of a private and a 
public sector. In the private sector there is an exchange on a market, based 
upon supply and demand, between sellers and buyers of goods, labour and 
capital. The public sector redistributes incomes, and produces, mainly 
outside the market, goods and services. 
 
In neoclassical economy the economy is usually considered as having the 
following characteristics: Regarding the market, it is considered as having 
the characteristics of a "free market", which means, 
- that activities at the market are a result of well informed, free and rational 
agents each optimizing their utility function (premise(1)), 
- that there is no private regulation of the market influencing the allocation 
process (premise(2)). 
Regarding the relationship between the public sector and the market sector 
is in neoclassical economy mostly described as having the characteristics: 
- Parliaments are via public regulation measures autonomously 
constructing the laws and institutional framework of the market. 
- Taxes are defined as neutral from an allocation point of view. 
- Goods and services from the public sector are defined as neutral from an 
allocation point of view. 
 
Consequently in neoclassical economy the public sector is defined as neutral 
regarding its regulation effects upon the market processes (premise (3)). 
 
The combination of the premise (2) and (3), that the private and the public 
sector do not distort the allocation process of the market, and premise (1), 
that the market process is governed by free, rational and well-informed 
actors, has as its consequence, that the production at a given point of time 
can be regarded as optimal. This premise of optimality is a precondition in 
most of the econometric models, inspired by neoclassical economy thinking, 
being used for energy planning purposes by macro economists. 
 
From this premise that we are living in the best of all worlds, can be 
deduced, that any change away from this optimum is considered as 
representing socioeconomic costs for society. Any policy implemented to 
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reduce greenhouse gas emissions is, for instance, in all computations 
regarded as causing extra costs to society. In these econometric models there 
is no such thing as systematical institutional mistakes in the economic 
process. This premise is wrong. It is necessary to see the economy as an 
institutional economy, where the present situation very probably may not be 
socioeconomically optimal at all. 
 
Towards an institutional economy 
The design of a successful energy policy cannot be found from analysis 
based on the abovementioned precondition. The main problem is, that the 
needed technical solutions, which secure the possibility of transgressions 
described in figure 1.2, requires new organizations and new institutions. The 
neoclassical model does consider the institutional conditions as given and 
not within the reach of systematic public regulation. It is essential to 
distinguish between the "free market" as it is described above, and the "real 
market" with its institutions at a given place and a given time. 
 
The "real market" is the market with its specific institutions as they are in 
reality, regarding private market power, public regulation, the infrastructure, 
information accessibility, business structure, etc. etc. This market very often 
has a considerable level of private regulation. Especially the energy scene is 
monopolistic or oligopolistic, with one or only a few suppliers of given 
goods. Or it can have many suppliers, which are interconnected by 
ownership relations and therefore are not mutual independent. Often 
information is kept secret by referring to the commercial interests, despite 
the fact that full information and openness are preconditions for well 
functioning free markets. All together the "real market" does not fulfill the 
institutional preconditions of the "free market" of the economic textbooks. 
The interplay between the "real market" and the "free market" is often one of 
ideology, where the strongest actors at an oligopolistic "real market" uses the 
ideology of the "free market" to argue for no public regulation, without to 
remove their own private regulation of the market. The argument, "let the 
free market decide" is, in the world of reality, often synonymous with the 
sentence "let us decide". "Us" means the largest energy supply companies at 
an oligopolistic market with only a few suppliers. 
 
Also, the "free market" premise of the public sector being neutral with 
regard to the market allocation processes is not fulfilled. It seems obvious, 
that the use of public money for education, roads, harbours, defence, medical 
cares, etc. all have different effects upon the direction the market processes 
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are taking. A high level of infrastructure investments in roads will support 
the sections of economy linked to the car industry. Military expense's 
supports economical sectors linked to the military projects of a given period. 
The examples are infinite, wherefore we do not believe in the premise (2) 
which tells, that the activity of the public sector does not influence the 
direction of the market processes. So even if the market sector was "free" in 
the sense of the textbooks on economics, the market would still not be free, 
due to the interference of the public sector. It therefore can be concluded, 
that in the world of market realities, there is always one or another form of 
either public or private hierarchial regulation. Regulation defined as any 
organised, purpose directed influence upon the framework of the market and 
organisation of cooperation at the market. 
 
 
1.4 Feasibility Studies and Public Regulation 
Regarding the present technical and institutional situation the following can 
be concluded: 
 
Technology should be regarded as consisting of technique, organization and 
knowledge. If only the technique component is changed, we define it as an 
“end of pipe“ solution. An example could be increased efficiency of the 
same technique as before, for instance smoke abatement measures, a better 
power plant, etc. In a large number of energy plans it is concluded, that 
“end of pipe” solutions are not sufficient, and that an energy conservation 
strategy requires changes in the combination of technique, organisation and 
knowledge.  
 
The established energy supply companies are capital intensive and have 
techniques with a long technical life time. At the same time this equipment is 
almost 100% asset specific, which means, that it cannot be used for other 
purposes, than energy production and distribution. When this is combined 
with the fact, that established supply companies often are comparatively 
financially strong and have established considerable political backing, it 
becomes difficult to introduce new technologies, which takes market share 
away from the established companies.  
 
The result of these difficulties is, that feasibility studies and public 
regulation analysis are often influenced by the interests and thinking of the 
established energy supply companies. This often means that public planning 
tends to favour short term considerations, as short term solutions are 
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organisational conservative and supports the interests of the established 
energy supply companies. The results of such planning procedures are "end 
of pipe" solutions in existing organisations; i.e. better power plants, smoke 
pollution abatement measures, heat pumps for electrical heating, etc. 
 
The precondition that the "real market" is in economic optimum, as it is 
usually supposed in macroeconomic models, is not realistic. For one thing, 
the market sector itself does not function according to the institutional 
presumptions of the "free market" ideal. Any market, and especially the 
market for energy is regulated either by private or public organizations. The 
public must be able to distinguish between the "free market" utopia of the 
textbooks and "real market". 
 
Using market forces as one of the mechanisms of allocation is often 
advisable. If the public regulation process decisively supports the 
preconditions for a "free market" it can be a part of a regulation process 
which supports the transgression of the boundaries of figure 1.2. This for 
instance, is done by removing the barriers to entry at a regional level, so that 
decentralized renewable energy technologies can get market access. By 
supporting a tariff policy, with a very low fixed share. 
 
Instead of taking the neoclassical economic optimum as the point of 
departure, any public regulation activity has to begin with some very 
concrete analyses of the institutional context around the given project in the 
given country/region. This is not an easy task, but a rather interesting one, as 
it can, potentially, result in the finding of projects which are both economical 
and environmentally feasible from a socioeconomic point of view. 
 
The above-mentioned conclusion regarding the present technical and 
institutional situation has the following consequences for feasibility studies 
and public regulation analysis. 
 
Socioeconomic feasibility studies should: 
-  Perform analysis with a very long time horizon in order to find the best 
solutions relatively independent of existing technical systems. 
-  Analyse the bindings of existing technical systems. This is especially 
important under conditions of overcapacity in the energy system. A 
system with overcapacity tends to result in either energy prices close to 
the short term marginal costs, or a pressure from the energy companies 
upon the political process, urging the politicians to protect the existing 
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energy companies from the competition of newcomer technologies. In 
figure 1.3 we call this process the “sunk cost” trap. 
- Analyse the links between the economy of a project, and the future 
changes of the technical energy system. If we are dealing with an energy 
conservation project; which impacts would a period of overcapacity have 
upon our project? What happens to the economy of solar heating systems 
in a system with much nuclear power, or a system with much 
cogeneration? Etc. Etc. We call this technical sensibility analysis. 
-  Analyse the links between the economy of the project and the legislation 
which is necessary for the feasibility of the project. What happens if a 
carbon dioxide taxation is introduced? What happens if the rules assuring 
the right to sell electricity to the public grid are abolished? What happens 
if economic policy results in increased interest rates? Etc.Etc. We call this 
for institutional sensibility analysis. 
-  Analyse the links between the above institutional sensibility analysis and 
the political process. Which agents at the energy market have the 
financial and political motivation to “kill” newcomer technologies? Are 
there counter forces which can support the newcomer technologies? How 
can the political balance of power at the energy scene be described? 
Which political scenarios can be developed, and which effects will they 
have upon our project? We call this analysis political sensibility analysis. 
 
Public regulation analysis should: 
-  Analyse not only regulation by means of taxes and subsidies, but also 
regulation by developing new institutions around the market. 
-  Be aware of the asymmetry of financial power between the old fossil 
fuel-based technologies, and the new energy conservation technologies. 
Often public regulation measures will not require subsidies for the new 
technologies, but just equal terms with regard to financial possibilities, by 
removing the capital advantages of the existing energy companies. 
-  Be aware of the asymmetry of political power between the old fossil fuel-
based technologies and the new energy conservation technologies. Often 
it is necessary to create organisations within research, price and 
monopoly control, advisory comities, and funding, which are totally 
independent of the established fossil fuel companies. 
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The consequences, and their links to the description of the historic technical 
and institutional situation are shown in the figure 1.3. 
 
Present technical and 
institutional situation  
Consequences for 
socioeconomic feasibility 
studies 
Consequences for public 
regulation proposals 
Existing technological 
system: 
- Single purpose companies 
- sectorial companies 
- Long lifetime of investments 
- 100% asset specificity 
- Strong from a capital point of 
  view 
- Politically strong  
(1) Necessary to make 
feasibility studies with a 
long time horizon 
(2) Necessary to be aware 
of the “sunk cost “ trap, 
binding the future 
technologies to the old 
technologies. 
(1) Public regulation 
which is able to generate 
change and transgress: 
(a) The sector 
boundaries. 
(b) The “sunk cost” 
bindings. 
Coming technological 
systems: 
- Multi purpose organisations 
- Technology differs from place 
   to place 
- Long lifetime of investments 
- 100% asset specificity 
- Weak from a capital point of  
   view 
- Weak from a political point of  
   view 
(3) Necessary to make 
thorough analysis of the 
innovation consequences 
of different projects. 
(4) Necessary to make 
technical sensibility 
analyses in order to 
evaluate the effects of a 
given project in different 
technical systems. 
(2)  Establish a 
technological 
development process, 
which is independent of 
the existing fossil fuel 
companies. 
(3) Establish rules at the 
market, which makes the 
existing technical system 
open for new 
technologies. 
General market conditions: 
- The existing situation is not 
   optimal 
- Economy consists of market+ 
   institutions 
- There is public as well as 
   private regulation of the  
   allocation processes. 
(5) Necessary to analyse 
the links between 
institutional conditions at 
the market and the 
economy of a project 
(institutional sensibility 
analysis). 
(6) Necessary to analyse 
the links between 
socioeconomic of a given 
project, and the political 
conditions influencing this 
economy (political 
sensibility analysis) 
(4) Establish a public 
regulation, which makes 
it possible to establish 
new institutions. 
(5) Suggest 
improvements in the 
political process , so that 
it can become 
increasingly independent 
of the fossil fuel 
technologies. 
Figure 1.3:  The present technical and institutional situation and its 
consequences for socioeconomic feasibility and public regulation studies. 
 
 
 Chapter 2 
Feasibility Studies 
 
In chapter 1 we developed a set of general guidelines linked to the present 
technical and institutional situation, regarding the contents of feasibility 
studies. In this chapter we deal with two main areas: 
- The development of a procedure helping to decide how feasibility studies 
should be performed in different situations (chapter 2.1). 
- A concrete description of principles and methods of  socioeconomic 
feasibility studies in particular(Chapter 2.2). 
The procedure of performing feasibility studies may be divided into the main 
steps described in figure 2.1. 
 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
What should be studied? 
Alternatives). 
For whom should it be 
studied? 
Why should it be studied? 
How should it be studied? 
(The Diamond-E-analysis) 
Implementation of the 
feasibility study according 
to the consept developed 
under step 1 and step 2. 
Figure 2.1:  The main steps in a feasibility analysis 
 
Step 1 deals with what should be studied and for whom and why should it be 
studied (The www- analysis).  
Step 2 deals with the detailed design of the contents of feasibility studies 
(The Diamond-E analysis).  
Step 3 deals with the concrete feasibility study and requires the major part of 
the feasibility study work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Performance of feasibility studies in different situations 
22 
 
Step 1: The www-analysis 
Some very important questions to be answered, when designing feasibility 
studies are: what should be studied, for whom, and why is the study made 
(www-analysis). Furthermore these questions have to be placed in a context, 
where the time horizon and time priority in the feasibility study is decided 
upon. When these questions have been answered, we can begin 
systematically to find out, how a specific feasibility study should be 
performed; i.e. questions like which consequences of a project one should 
analyse, and how such analyses should be carried out. 
 
What should be studied? 
The studies can be single project analyses, where for instance a power plant, 
a heat plant, a combined heat and power plant, energy conservation measures 
in an apartment complex, etc.etc., is analysed. This type of studies may, for 
instance, be performed by means of Kvdesign. The studies may also be 
energy systems analyses, where an energy scenario consisting of a set of 
technologies is analysed. The SESAM program can be used for this type of 
analysis. At present it is common to make single project analyses without 
any systematic discussion concerning the effects of different future energy 
scenarios upon the economy of the single project. But the situation has 
changed in such a way, that single project analyses are nolonger sufficient, 
neither when making business - nor socioeconomic feasibility studies.  
 
It is important to note that the energy efficient technological systems needed 
are characterized by an increasing number of interrelations between the 
components of the system. The necessity of analysing the interrelationship 
between electricity and heat production , when cogeneration is increasing its 
share of the market, is one of the more obvious examples of this 
development. Furthermore the expectancy of long technical life for the 
transmission and distribution system of any power or heat production and 
the even longer life often expected from conservation improvements in 
buildings, makes it likely that the newcomer technologies could be very 
different from the technologies of today, within the lifetime of a power plant 
built today. 
 
 
 
Concludingly it is emphasized that feasibility studies of power plants, 
distribution systems and efficiency improvements at the consumer level 
should include studies regarding the feasibility of the specific investment 
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seen in relation to scenarios of technical changes in the energy system of 
which it is a part. Calculation tools for this analysis are the Sesam model and 
Kvdesign. 
 
For whom and why are feasibility studies made?  
Feasibility studies can be made for the national government, municipalities, 
energy supply companies, housing companies, private companies, 
etc.etc.The direct purpose of such studies may be to demonstrate the 
necessary documentation when for instance deciding which investment to 
choose among technical alternatives and which implementation strategy to 
choose among implementation alternatives. The same applies when 
demonstrating documentation regarding project feasibility in connection 
with applications for for loans. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, feasibility studies are often divided into 
socioeconomic feasibility studies, where the purpose is to examine whether a 
given project is feasible from the point of view of the society as a whole, and 
business feasibility studies, where the purpose is to examine whether a given 
project is economical from the point of view of a specific firm. 
 
When dealing with the above division, we find it important to point out, that 
it gets less important, in very long term infra-structural projects. In projects 
with a technical life of 20-40 years, the technical and institutional conditions 
around the project will change very much during its life time.  
When dealing with such time horizons, it is therefore necessary to analyse a 
broad spectrum of socioeconomic consequences of different energy 
scenarios. Within a time span of 20-40 years it has no sense to calculate as if 
the legislation, technological possibilities etc.etc. would not change. Within 
such a time span tough CO2 taxation policies could be carried out, making 
for instance coal based energy systems obsolete many years before they are 
technically worn down.  
 
In figure 2.2. the relationship between business, socioeconomy and public 
regulation is illustrated for capital intensive technologies with a long 
technical lifetime. 
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Figure 2.2:  The relationship between business economy, socioeconomy and 
public regulation. 
 
The figure shows that in Situation I you have specific conditions in the 
market and a specific legislation (public regulation I ). Under these 
conditions there might be economic conditions favouring the existing 
technologies based upon extensive use of fossil fuel. And the economy in 
energy conservation might be bad from a business economic point of view 
(business economy I). Nevertheless socioeconomic feasibility studies 
(socioeconomy I) might show, that development and investment in 
cogeneration, renewable energy and energy conservation might be feasible 
from the point of view of society as a whole. If that´s the case, we shall find 
ourselvesin a situation, where what is good for society is not good for 
business. This situation is then discussed in the democratic institutions (the 
dotted circle), including Parliament, and a “public regulation II“ is 
developed and implemented. This public regulation should assure that what 
is best from the point of view of the society is also best for business, as a 
business economy II is established, which results in the same priority as 
socioeconomy I. Now an ideal situation is established, where the market 
companies will act in accordance with what is best for society. 
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In Situation I in figure 2.2, a company who wants to investigate whether a 
cogeneration plant, investments in conservation measures, etc., should carry 
out business feasibility studies (evaluate business economy I) in order to 
estimate the economic consequences under given institutional and technical 
conditions (market economy I, and public regulation I ). But we also 
recommend, that the same company performs socioeconomic feasibility 
studies (analyse socioeconomy I) in order to evaluate the socioeconomic 
feasibility studies, which the government might be making. In this way a 
company might find out in advance which types of changes in public 
regulation (public regulation II) the Government could introduce. 
 
The government should carry out socioeconomic feasibility studies (analyse 
socioeconomy I) in order to develop an energy policy which pursues the 
goals of society. But we also recommend, that the government undertakes 
business economic feasibility studies (analyse business economy I) , in order 
to understand the calculations made by the companies under the given 
market conditions.  
 
Concludingly it is emphasized, that both business - and socioeconomic 
feasibility studies should be elaborated by both governmental institutions 
and private organisations. 
 
An Example:  
In figure 2.3, the difference between the type of socioeconomic feasibility 
studies made by the Danish administration and business economic feasibility 
studies is resumed. It should be emphasized, that this is an illustrative 
example, just to show what it is all about. It does, however, not encompass 
all the features which according to this chapter, should be contained in 
feasibilitystudies. 
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Handling of costs and 
income data 
Socioeconomic feasibility 
studies as they are carried 
out in the Danish energy 
planning procedure 
Business economic feasibility 
studies 
Scenarios regarding 
costs and prices 
Exclusive taxes on goods 
and services 
Inclusive all taxes 
Energy price scenarios According to estimates 
made by the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy  
According to estimates made by 
the company for whom the study 
is made 
 
Interest calculation-rate In Denmark a “net” 
interest calculation rate of 
around 7% p.a. 
Usually scenarios regarding 
interest rates at the market. 
Environmental costs Are included, either as a 
cost assessment or as an 
emission limit 
Normally not included.  
Employment effects Considerations are 
included 
Normally not included 
Importation effects  Considerations are 
included 
Normally not included 
Figure 2.3: An example of the difference between business and socio-
economic feasibility studies. 
 
Which time horizon and time priority should be used? 
The time horizon is the period within which our calculations are made. 
When dealing with single investments the time horizon is often equivalent 
with the expected technical life time of the investment. When dealing with 
energy systems and energy scenario developments the time horizon is 
chosen in accordance with the specific purpose of the study. Regarding time 
priority, this refers to the priority within the time horizon. This priority is 
usually effectuated by means of a calculation interest, giving relatively 
higher values to costs and incomes in the near future, than costs and incomes 
in the far future. 
 
It is characteristic for the present dynamics in the market, that many firms 
optimize their investment decisions by looking only at their short term 
marginal costsparticularly when they have overcapacity and scarce financial 
resources. It is even more characteristic, that public energy planning is 
dominated by optimization based on such short term optimization of existing 
plants and energy systems. At the same time the needed technological 
changes reinforce the need to establish long term strategies. 
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Important 
questions  
when preparing 
feasibility studies 
Questions in relation to 
present situation of 
change 
Important answers when preparing 
feasibility studies 
What should be 
studied? 
Energy efficiency 
scenarios implicate an 
increased level of 
interrelations between 
the different components 
of the energy system. 
The feasibility of a specific project should 
be seen in relation to scenarios of 
technical changes in the energy system of 
which it is a part. 
For whom and 
why are feasibility 
studies made? 
Energy techniques have 
a long life time (20-40 
years). Within this 
period technical as well 
as institutional 
conditions will change. 
Both governmental and private 
organisations/investors who carry out 
feasibility studies should elaborate 
business as well as socioeconomic 
feasibility studies. This combination 
would include analyses of the long term 
processes of technical and institutional 
changes. 
Which time 
horizon and time 
priority should be 
used? 
Tendency for short term 
optimization, which is 
in conflict with long 
term strategy. 
Feasibility studies should include studies 
of the socioeconomical consequences of 
the conflict between short term 
optimization and long term strategies of 
technological innovation. (SESAM is one 
tool for this analysis). 
Figure 2.4:  Important questions and important answers, when preparing 
feasibility studies. 
 
This situation of economic conflict underlines the necessity to concentrate 
upon the very difficult task of establishing a short term policy, which is 
syncronized with the long term strategy. The difficulties are caused by the 
fact, that in the present situation of technological change within the energy 
area, there is a relatively strong contradiction between what is economic 
within a short term perspective, and what is the best long term energy 
strategy. But although not easy, the task should be carried out, and it is 
therefore unwise to divide sharply between short term and long term effects 
of investments and investment scenarios. The analyses should rather focus 
upon making an “analytic” bridge between short and long term effects of 
investments or investment scenarios in order to find “economic” transition 
paths between the existing technologies and the necessary future 
technologies. 
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Concludingly we therefore emphasize the necessity of integrating the near 
future with the long term perspective, in business- as well as in 
socioeconomic feasibility studies. In figure 2.4 the above discussed 
important questions are linked with some important answers.  
 
Step 2:  The Diamond-E analysis 
After step 1, the www analysis above, we establish a set of criteria telling us 
which consequences of a project one should analyse, and how such analyses 
should be carried out. A way of systematizing this analysis is to use the 
Diamond-E framework described in figure 2.5 is useful. 
 
Organizational
Resources
Organizational
Goals
Strategy
(Feasibility
Studies)
Natural and
Socioeconomic
Environment
Financial
Resources
Present Technical and Institutional Situation (Chapter I)
51 4
2
3
 
Figure 2.5: The diamond-E framework. Feasibility studies are elaborated as 
a tool in the process of designing a strategy (box1). This design of strategy 
is, in the Diamond-E (Fry 1986) framework a part of a system consisting of: 
a) Organisational goals (box2) 
b) Organizational resources (box3) 
c) Financial resources (box4), 
d  Natural and socioeconomic environment (box5) 
The discussion regarding the exact design of feasibility studies may pass 
through an analysis of each of the areas a),b),c) and d). This discussion is 
coloured by the background discussion in chapter 1, regarding the “present 
technical and institutional situation”. 
 
One can design a feasibility study by discussing a combination of 
organisational goals, organisational resources and financial resources, all of 
it seen in relation to the natural and socioeconomic environment. 
 
Organisational goals: 
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If the organisational goal includes a demand for technological innovation, 
employment generation, national energy independence and environmental 
sustainability, then the feasibility study should naturally focus upon the 
effects within these areas. If the goals are more short term economics, then 
the feasibility study should concentrate on these goals. A feasibility study 
must relate to the specific goals of the project investor. This also means, that 
in any feasibility study, these goals must be made explicit and open. 
 
Organisational resources: 
If the organisational resources are of such a character that good skilled 
workers and factories are available who are able to build and maintain a new 
cogeneration plant, then this technology is a rather uncomplicated 
possibility. If there are good skilled workers and firms available who are 
able to improve the energy efficiency of the buildings, then this type of 
investment is also relatively uncomplicated. If these organisational resources 
are not available, then education programmes might be necessary before 
investing. Or it might be necessary, in initial stages of investment, to import 
“turn key” projects. But quite often this is not easy from a financial point of 
view. A feasibility study must locate and relate to organisational key 
charateristics, linked to the implementation of a specific projects.  
 
Financial resources: 
Obviously the access to financial resources may influence the focus of 
feasibility studies. If for instance the consumers have a low ability to pay 
their bills, feasibility studies should focus upon this problem. If this is not a 
problem, feasibility studies may focus upon other areas. If the financial 
situation is characterized by turbulence , with inflation risk, devaluation risk, 
etc. etc., then feasibility studies should establish sensitivity analysis around 
these topics. So before designing the feasibility study, one should establish a 
preliminary profile of the financial opportunities and problems. A feasibility 
study must relate to the financial key characteristics , linked to the 
implementation of a specific project. 
 
Natural and socioeconomic external environment:  
Which demands regarding air pollution, for instance green house gas 
emissions will developin the international community? How do such 
demands influence the loan conditions, when borrowing money in 
international banks? Regarding the socioeconomic environment, it seems 
obvious to include considerations regarding the ongoing “liberalization” 
process in the electricity and gas sector within the European Union and 
Scandinavia. It might also be worthwhile to analyse the development of 
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ownership structure in the energy sector. In the Baltic countries the impact of 
the “Baltic ring” activities could be of interest. A feasibility study must relate 
to the main external socioeconomic and environmental impacts.  
 
In the following a couple of Danish examples illustrate what is meant by 
using the Diamond-E framework. These illustrations would be far more 
comprehensive in a real feasibility study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 1: The Danish Energy Policy Case  
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Diamond-E analysis 
Organisational goals: Among others the goals of 
the Danish energy policy (Danish Ministry of 
Environment and Energy, 1996), are to assure: 
- That the Danish CO2 emission is reduced by 20% 
   from 1988-2005 
- That energy efficiency is improved by 20% from  
   1994-2005. 
-  That the proportion of renewable energy is 
   increased to between 12-14% of the total energy  
   consumption in 2005, 
-  That a flexible, robust and cost efficient energy 
   system is developed. 
-  That the public is engaged in formulating the  
   objectives of energy policy. 
 
Organizational resources:  
-  A population which can participate actively in  
   political processes. 
-  A business structure with many small firms, 
-  250,000 - 4,500,000 without employment. 
-  A demographic structure with many people in the 
   work force until around 2010. After that the work 
   force will decrease with around 200,000 persons. 
 
Financial resources: 
-  A rather weak economy in the sense, that there is  
   a high level of foreign debt. 
-  A high level of public debt. 
-  A rather stable economy, where the consumers  
   can pay there energy bills. 
 
Natural and socioeconomic environment: 
-  A high Danish greenhouse gas emission, which  
   makes it environmentally and politically necessary 
   to lower the Danish greenhouse gas emission. 
-  In Europe an increasing level of so-called  
   liberalization reforms take place in the energy 
   markets. 
-  There is a tendency of internationalizing  
   ownership of energy systems. 
-  A very open economy which making the Danish  
   international competitiveness sensitive to any  
   implementation strategy within the energy area. 
-  A period from 1995 to around 2010- 2020 with a 
   high level of oil and natural gas self sufficiency.  
After this period Denmark, and Europe are again 
increasingly dependant upon oil from the Middle 
East. 
 Proceeding from the Diamond-E framework 
analyses to its consequences for the design of 
feasibility studies required in the specific 
analyses, we state the following about the Danish 
energy planning case: 
 
Consequences for the contents of feasibility 
studies 
The organisation goals tells that 
-  examining energy efficiency scenarios is  
   essential.  
-  examining the technical robustness and  
   flexibility of scenarios is important. 
-  the suggested solutions should be calculated in  
    a way that makes it possible to establish a  
    participatory planning process.     
 
Analyses of the organisational resources tell that 
-  Analysing the employment effects of different  
   scenarios is important, 
-  calculations should be made where labour has  
    a rather low shadow value 
-  energy strategies with a focus upon  
   decentralized technologies should be analysed,  
   as they might fit well with the Danish  
   industrial structure,  
-  accelerated investments in energy efficiency  
   measures before 2010 should be represented in  
   the Scenario analysis. (High unemployment  
   rates combined with a relatively high  
   percentage of the population in the labour force  
   until 2010).  
 
Analyses of the financial resources suggests that 
- proposed public regulation’s schemes should  
  not increase the public debt or the foreign debt. 
Taxes should finance subsidies. 
 
Analyses of the natural and socioeconomic 
environmental conditions suggest that, 
-  solutions should be analysed regarding their  
   effects upon the international competitiveness  
   of the Danish firms, 
-  solutions should be analyses regarding their  
   robustness within the ongoing “liberalization”  
   and internalization processes within the energy  
   area. 
-  solutions should decrease the Danish  
   dependence upon fossil fuels considerable  
   before the year 2010.  
 
 
Example 2: The Sønderholm DCHP case  
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Diamond-E analysis 
Organisational goals : 
- To decrease expenses in a long term perspective 
   without higher short term heat prices than now. 
- To have a stable heat supply system. 
- To establish a heat supply system without direct 
   consumer investments. 
 
Organisational resources: 
- 259 households who want to establish a DCHP  
  plant, if they do not have to spend time organizing  
  the implementation of a DCHP. 
- A group of 4-5 persons which are willing to spend  
  time in organizing the feasibility studies and the  
  implementation of a DCHP. 
- Consultancy companies and production companies  
  who are able to deliver trustworthy advice and  
  reliable hardware. 
 
Financial resources. 
- Consumers which are willing, and able to pay the  
  heat bill. 
- A public guaranty for loans in district heating  
  systems. 
- A financial system which is able to supply long  
  term index regulated loans for district heating  
  systems. 
 
Natural and socioeconomic environment: 
- A public policy which includes DCHP as an  
  important part of necessary energy conservation  
  activities.  
- A public policy giving municipal guaranties for  
  investments in district heating systems. 
- A public policy establishing the necessary  
  institutional conditions, making DCHP 
  economically feasible. 
- A public energy policy willing to support DCHPs  
  against the attacks from the established power  
  companies. 
 
Consequences for content of the feasibility studies 
From organisational goals: 
- The implementation alternative should look for  
   financing models assuring, that the future heat  
   prices are not higher than the oil furnace  
   alternative.  
- The consumers do not require nor expect  
  decreases in heat prices the first years . 
 
From organisational resources: 
- Solutions which are robust and with low  
  maintenance costs should be preferred, and  
  therefore thoroughly analysed. 
- Evaluating different technical solutions is possible,  
  due to a gender group of 5-6 very active persons in  
  the village. 
 
From financial resources we have: 
- Due to a municipal guaranty, it is possible to  
  establish a district heating system , although it  
  includes rather high investments. On the other hand  
  it should be emphasized, that index regulated loans is  
  a relatively unknown method of financing, and it  
  might be difficult to understand what happens in  
  conditions of inflation in connection with lowered  
  wages and pensions.  
- Therefore there has to be a focus upon a very  
  thorough set of sensibility analyses, to prepare  
  measures to be taken in the different risk situations.  
This process should include that the management of the 
local DCHP plant is completely open towards the 
consumers regarding the risk situation and the risk 
management. 
 
From natural and socioeconomic environment we 
have: 
- Some difficulties with the established electricity  
  power stations, which tend to be unwilling to pay the  
  long term marginal avoided costs for the electricity  
  which they buy from the electricity companies.  
Therefore, the feasibility study should include  
sensibility analyses regarding changes in the price on 
electricity sold to the public grid. 
- The same type of problems with the natural gas  
  company and the same reaction regarding sensibility  
  analyses. 
- That an associationof DCHP plants has to be  
  organized to protect the necessary “frame conditions”  
  on the market. 
- An upcoming “liberalization “ of the electricity and  
  gas market might change the economy of Sønderholm  
  DCHP substantially. 
  
The consequences for the feasibility study are: 
- Considerations regarding the political risks, and  
  especially their possible consequences upon the  
  economy of the plant is necessary. 
- Considerations regarding the political strenght of the  
  relatively new DCHP organisation. To what extent  
  can it cope politically with the power- and gas 
  companies. 
- Also from this point comes, that it seems very  
  important to make many sensibility analyses, to  
  establish risk management procedures and to assure  
  total openness regarding these procedures, so that  
  they are easily understandable for the consumers. 
 
 
2.2 Step 3: Socioeconomic feasibility studies 
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 Socioeconomic analysis  
The space dimension 
(a) The interdependence 
between a technology and the 
surrounding energy system. 
(technical sensibility analysis) 
 
- the economy of single technologies as a function of the  
  surrounding energy system. 
- sensibility to overcapacity in the surrounding energy  
  system 
(b) Analyses the interrelations 
between the project and the 
socioeconomic environment.  
(institutional and political 
sensibility analysis) 
- employment effects  
- foreign exchange effects 
- income distribution effects 
- effects on state finance 
- balance of power in the existing market 
- political situation around essential legislation. 
(c) Analysis of the 
environmental effects of 
energy investments. 
Analysis of environmental effects, for instance: 
- risk area connected to greenhouse gas emissions, and  
  other types of air pollution. 
- ground water pollution, radiation, resource depletion,  
  etc.etc. 
The time dimension 
(a)Time priority 
 
- selection of an interest rate to be used in calculations. 
- analysis of interest rate built into existing organizations 
(b) Impacts of historical 
investments. 
- analysing how to handle “sunk costs” in the alculations. 
- analysing the sensitivity to sunk costs in the surrounding  
  energy systems 
(c)Technological development - analysis of the effects upon technological development. 
The risk dimension - Sensibility analysis linked to different scenarios/single  
  technologies. 
Figure 2.6:  The areas of space, time and risk in socioeconomic feasibility 
studies. 
 
From chapter 2.2. we have gone through the www- analysis, step 1 , and the 
diamond-E analysis step 2 in the feasibility studies. Here, in step 3, the 
socioeconomic feasibility study designed in step 1 and 2 will be performed. 
In this chapter we discuss some important methods to be used, when 
performing a socioeconomic feasibility study. From Chapter 1 figure 1.3. we 
have developed some requirements which socioeconomic feasibility studies 
should fulfill. They are resumed in figure 2.6 and discussed in detail in this 
chapter. The requirements are divided into the geographic space dimension, 
the time dimension and the socioeconomic risk dimension. 
By the space dimension we mean that we go from the near surroundings, the 
energy system environment,to the more distant general socioeconomic 
surroundings and to far away surroundings, the relationship to for instance 
global clima. By the time dimension we mean how the time horizon is treated 
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in our calculations. The risk dimension is linked to both the space and the 
time dimension. The longer the time horizon the more difficult to foresee, 
what could happen.  
 
The Diamond-E analysis helps to decide the specific content of a feasibility 
study as described above. Example: In the case of the Danish energy policy 
this Diamond-E analysis tells that feasibility studies should include: 
-  Energy efficiency and low greenhouse gas emission scenarios. 
-  Examinations of employment and balance of payment consequences of 
different scenarios. 
-  Examination of strategies that donot increase the public debt. 
-  Examinations of strategies that do not impede the international 
competitiveness of the Danish industry and agricultural sector. 
-  Scenarios with accelerate investments before 2010. 
-  Decentralization energy scenarios. 
-  Scenarios which make a participatory planning process possible. 
 
Analysing the interdependence between a given technology and the energy 
system environment. 
Here the question is how a specific energy scenario influences the 
socioeconomy of a single technology over time. 
 
Example 1. The interplay between windpower and energy system. In 
Denmark an important question has been and still is,  
(a)  which percentage windpower is it technically feasible to introduce into 
the energy system, and, 
(b)  which value has wind energybased electricity for the energy system as a 
whole. 
The answer to question (a) is that it depends upon the character of the energy 
system in which windpower is embedded. This is illustrated in figure 2.7. 
 
“Surplus electricity” is defined as electricity for which there is no Danish 
market at the time of production with the given technical system. The 
amount of “surplus” electricity is higher in a power generating system 
consisting of mainly large power plants, than in a system consisting of many 
decentralised cogeneration units linked to water storage and heat pump 
systems (here called LOCUS systems). In 1983 the DEFU, a research unit 
financed by the Danish power companies, carried out calculations which 
showed, that a 10% windpower supply would result in a situation, where 30% 
of the windpower would be “surplus electricity”. In case of a 30% 
windpower supply they demonstrated, that around 70% could be regarded as 
35 
“surplus electricity”. The conclusion was, that windpower could not supply 
any substantial part of the Danish electricity production. 
 
This conclusion was true under the presumption that, windpower was placed 
in an energy system with only large (and inflexible) coalfired power plants. 
What was wrong was that it was not mentioned that if the power plant 
system was made flexible, a much larger proportion of windpower could be 
introduced. In a later study (Lund 1986) it was proved that flexible LOCUS 
systems consisting of decentralized combined heat and power plants, heat 
pumps, and a water storage system, did not have similar problems, as 
“surplus electricity” is converted to heat by means of a heat pump, and 
stored in the water storage system. Due to the use of heat pumps, this type of 
flexibility is achieved without losing the energy efficiency of the system. The 
way of analysing such questions today is to make energy systems scenarios 
with the SESAM model. 
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Figure 2.7:  “Surplus” electricity as a function of percentage windpower of 
total electricity production. 
 
 
 
Our conclusion is that it is necessary to establish in depth investigations 
regarding the interrelation between a single technology, and the development 
of the energy system in which this single technology is placed. This is 
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necessary because of the long technical life time of most energy investments 
and because of the increased interrelationship between the different 
components of the energy system. This interdependence is increased because 
of increased use of cogeneration, renewable energy systems and energy 
conservation technologies. The SESAM simulation system can be used for 
this type of investigations. 
 
Analysis of the interdependence between energy systems and the 
socioeconomic environment 
Consumer income distribution and ability to invest in energy technologies.  
It is an important part of the Danish experience, that the concrete 
socioeconomical situation of the different consumer groups, private 
households, public companies and private companies has a huge influence 
on the possibilities of energy policy. These measures were taken after a 
public debate, among others from different analysis of the socioeconomic 
situation of different consumer groups. 
For instance it was concluded in (Kvistgaard 1983) that different income 
groups had very different possibilities for investing in energy conservation in 
North Jutland. Quite often pensioners were in a situation, where they could 
only invest in energy conservation, if they could save more than 3000 
Dkr/year, when investing 10000 Dkr in house insulation with a technical life 
time of around 20-30 years. Average income families would only require to 
save around than 1500 Dkr/year, as they could easily get loans in banks or 
other credit institutions. 
 
Analysis of this type resulted in an energy policy, with public payment of 
around 25% of the heat bills of low income pensioners, in combination with 
a 50% subsidy for investments in heat conservation measures. A special 
municipal guaranty for investment in district heating systems was introduced 
in the late eighties to assure that low income groups could afford to join the 
system. This reform was important for the introduction of decentralized 
district heating systems based on cogeneration of heat and electricity. 
In 1983 it was analysed to what extent the farmers could finance investment 
in biogas plants (Hvelplund 1983). It was concluded that the farmers who 
could get the necessary loans were old and unwilling to enter innovative 
investments, and that the innovative farmers could not finance biogas plants. 
No public policy was ever introduced to handle these problems financially. 
Consequently the introduction of farmer biogas plants never has had any 
success. 
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One may conclude, that also in Denmark, with its rather stable 
socioeconomic development, it has been necessary to analyse the concrete 
socioeconomic situation of different consumer groups.  
In countries with larger socioeconomical changes, analyses within this area 
are even more important.  
Such analyses should be characterized by a thorough investigation of: 
- Where are the large energy conservation possibilities? 
- How are the different consumer- and income groups distributed within 
these possibilities? 
- How is the financial and organizational situation of these groups? 
 
Employment and importation effects of different energy scenarios 
The purpose of analysing employment and importation effects is: 
a)  To make it possible to select energy scenarios and energy systems with a 
high fraction of local regional and national employment, and a low 
importation content.  
b)  To foresee the character of employment in order to establish the needed 
qualifications in the labour force. 
 Employment and importation analyses in the eighties were an official part 
of the heat planning procedure performed by the municipalities. It was, 
and is motivated by a situation with a rather high unemployment rate and 
a foreign debt of around 300 billion Dkr.  
 
It is important to understand, that giving priority to projects with a high 
employment effect and low importation ratio, should not be used in casethe 
project is not in accordance with the goals of the Danish energy policy. The 
special situation in the energy scene is that energy conservation, renewable 
energy systems and district heating systems are all technologies needed for 
an energy efficiency policy, with a high employment effect and a rather low 
importation ratio. In a situation with high unemployment rates and a high 
foreign debt, it is therefore advisable to make systematic analyses of the 
employment and importation effects of the different energy scenarios and the 
different single technology alternatives which are analysed. 
 
In Denmark several feasibility studies of energy projects or energy plans 
have included the consequences on employment and the balance of payment. 
The calculations of such consequences have been based on extensive 
statistical material which has been collected as part of two research projects 
carried out at Aalborg University, one in 1985-86 and one in 1995-96. The 
calculation of employment and foreign exchange rates based on the collected 
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data is based on a computer model, which has been constructed by Klaus 
Illum (Lund 1986). 
The results are directed towards energy planners in central and local 
government, employees in interest organisations and others who have an 
interest in calculating and analysing the balance of payments and 
employment effects, which are related to different energy investments. 
 
The collection methods and presentation of the tables are identical for the 
investigations from the 1980's and 1990's, in the following points: 
- Employment information is divided to correspond with categories of 
employees. 
- Assessments are based on the accounts (or budgets) of specific plant 
investment with indication of the stages in the production chain 
immediately prior to the energy plant. The chain of production is analysed 
in reverse, stage by stage. 
- In the first stage there has been direct information collection from the 
suppliers of the components and labour. Further back in the chain, there is 
a greater use of statistical input/output figures. 
 
In the investigation from the 1980's, input/output statistics were not used in 
the calculation of direct and indirect effects. The problem then, as now, was 
that the statistics did not disaggregate electricity supply, gas supply and 
district heating supply, just as the statistics could not be disaggregated for 
the calculation of the factor demands for sustainable energy and energy 
saving practices. As a result, a lot of information was collected directly from 
the suppliers of the equipment and plants in the 1980's investigation. This 
has influenced the degree of detail, in relation to how the suppliers of 
components make demands on a number of branches in the tertiary sector. In 
the 1990's investigation, disaggregated statistics are used for 27 branches (in 
some cases even more disaggregated data are used). This improvement has 
enabled the results to be more precise, with reference to the calculation of 
effects in the service branches. 
 
 
 
 
The results are shown in figure 2.8. The results are expressed with 
employment shown as the number of persons per million DKK invested 
(price level 1995). The research project also provides figures divided into 
trades. 
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Energy technology         Persons per   Import 
              Million DKK   share 
Coal fired district heating        2.5     0.20 
Straw fired district heating        2.4     0.21 
Wood fired district heating        2.4     0.20 
Gas fired district heating         2.6     0.19 
Oil fired district heating         2.7     0.16 
Electrical heat pump (Danish)       2.7     0.13 
Electrical heat pump (imported)      1.0     0.69 
Natural gas engine plant(3 MW)      2.1     0.37 
Waste fired combined cycle plant      1.7     0.46 
Waste fired steam turbine plant       2.1     0.33 
Natural gas combined cycle plant      1.6     0.48 
Waste burning plant          2.3     0.26 
Coal fired cogeneration (Imported boiler)    1.5     0.44 
Coal fired cogeneration (Danish boiler)    1.8     0.37 
Natural gas fired boiler (400 MW)      1.8     0.35 
Solar energy capture field        1.7     0.31 
Wind generator - 500 kW        1.7     0.37 
Marine located wind generators      2.1     0.28 
Solar electricity plant         2.4     0.22 
District heating supply pipes       2.4     0.20 
Natural gas supply pipes        2.5     0.22 
District heating pipe network       3.0     0.15 
Electricity transmission lines       2.5     0.13 
Domestic heating installation       2.8     0.13 
District heating installation        2.8     0.15 
Domestic oil fired boiler        2.7     0.18 
Replacement of domesticoil fired boiler    2.4     0.19 
New domestic oil fired boiler(incl. fuel oil tank)  2.4     0.22 
Natural gas fired boiler         2.1     0.32 
Electrical heating          2.1     0.45 
Wood chip fired boiler         2.0     0.25 
Domestic solar energy capture plant     2.3     0.22 
Farm biogas plant          2.3     0.21 
Energy advisory services, domestic      1.2     0.21 
Lighting             0.9     0.54 
Freezers             1.4     0.37 
Refrigerators            1.1     0.48 
Cooking stoves           0.9     0.54 
Washing machines          0.9     0.54 
Tumble driers machines         0.9     0.54 
Dish washers            0.9     0.54 
Energy advisory services, industrial     3.0     0.03 
Pumps              3.4     0.10 
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Energy technology         Persons per   Import 
              Million DKK   share 
Compressors            2.5     0.20 
Cooling plants           2.3     0.20 
Process             1.8     0.39 
Lighting             1.2     0.58 
Insulation of roofs/roof spaces       2.2     0.19 
Cavity wall insulation         2.4     0.15 
Pipe insulation           3.5     0.04 
External insulation          2.4     0.14 
Double glazing           3.2     0.15 
Double windows           2.2     0.18 
Glazed facades           2.8     0.24 
Sealing of joints           2.2     0.29 
Clock steered night heat reduction      2.1     0.39 
Thermostatic valves          1.9     0.12 
Heat recycling           2.0     0.25 
Wood briquet production (wholesalers)    2.2     0.23 
Wood briquet production        2.2     0.21 
Coal              0.2     0.90 
Natural gas            0.2     0.90 
Fuel oils             0.2     0.90 
Petroleum gas           0.3     0.85 
Petrol              0.3     0.85 
Straw              2.2     0.13 
Wood chips            1.9     0.22 
Animal manure           2.2     0.13 
Waste              2.2     0.20 
Wind generated power (distribution agreement)  2.6     0.08 
Coalfired Power Station's operating account   2.7     0.19 
Operation and maintenance of biogas plants   2.9     0.16 
Figure 2.8:  Schedule of results for the employment investigation 1995. 
Employment rates are pr. 1 million DKK investments in construction works. 
Price level is year 1995. The costs do not include taxes or subsidies. The 
capital cost includes complete plant costs. 
 
 
 
 
Application of the statistics 
The quantitative information in figure 2.8. indicates which employment and 
import effects are caused by the different energy investments. It is possible 
to calculate the effects on employment, e.g. by producing 1 kWh electricity, 
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in one way or another. This is used to compare a wind generated kWh with a 
coal fired kWh as shown in figure 2.9. 
 
           Wind generation           Coal firing 
Preconditions 
Construction costs      DKK 7000/kW            DKK 8000/kW 
Operating time         2200 hours p.a.        7000 hours p.a. 
Operational life            20 years             30 years 
Interest              7%      7% 
Opera.&Maint.costs as a percentage    2%      3% 
Efficiency             47% 
Coal prices        DKK 13/GJ 
Results 
Price          DKK 0.306/kWh   DKK 0.197/kWh 
Import          DKK 0.112/kWh   DKK 0.123/kWh 
Employment        53 persons/GWh   20 persons/GWh 
Figure 2.9:  A comparison of the effects on employment and balance of 
payments in the production of electricity by means of wind generation and 
coal firing. 
 
The calculations indicate that wind generation creates more Danish 
employment than coal firing. It also indicates that wind generation would be 
better for the balance of payments. But there is a significant problem with 
this comparison. It is very sensitive to the preconditions concerning the 
technical system one assumes the two technologies to be placed in. In the 
calculations in figure 2.9 there is no consideration of what happens when the 
wind does not blow. Thus, it is implicitly intended for wind generation to be 
placed in a system which is able to store electricity or which has the 
necessary reserves for production of electricity. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the coal fired power generating station produces for an operating time of 
7000 hours per year, thus implicitly assuming that the station is not part of a 
system where it can advantageously take over production from older 
generating stations. An operating time of 7000 hours per year would be 
unrealistic over a 30 year period. 
 
 
 
              Wind generation   Coal firing 
Preconditions 
The same preconditions as in figure 2.9, except that in the case of wind 
generation there is an investment in reserve effect (new coal fired power 
generating station), and an operating time of 4000 hours p.a. is used for coal 
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firing as compared to 7000 hours p.a.. 
Results 
Price        DKK 0.467/kWh   DKK 0.266Wh 
Import       DKK 0.168/kWh   DKK 0.147/kWh 
Employment     82 persons/GWh   32 persons/GWh 
Figure 2.10:  A comparison of the effects on employment and balance of 
payments in the production of electricity by means of wind generation and 
coal firing, with alterations in the system preconditions as compared with 
figure 2.9. 
 
The stated system preconditions are extremely important. In figure 2.10, the 
same calculations have been made as in figure 2.9, but with the following 
differences: For wind generation a reserve effect is calculated the form of a 
new coal fired power generating station, and for coal firing an operating time 
of 4000 hours p.a. is calculated, corresponding to the distribution of average 
Danish electricity consumption including reserve. 
 
The results in figure 2.10 appear to indicate that investments in wind 
generation would be important for increased employment, but that they 
would also be bad for the balance of payments. It should be noted that this 
presentation is hardly reasonable, because a new coal fired power generating 
station would not be the most appropriate means with which to provide a 
reserve effect for wind generation. 
 
The significance of the comparison is the illustration of the need to specify 
which technical system each technology is placed in, when it is to be 
assessed in terms of economics, foreign exchange and employment. 
Development of wind generation is very sensitive to whether the system is a 
coal fired steam turbine system, or a system with decentralised cogeneration 
with heat storage and control possibilities. Development of cogeneration is 
very much dependent on the size of the variations in the demand for heat and 
the demand for electricity. Insulation activities are very dependent on 
whether the heating is from domestic oilfired boilers or from cogenerated 
district heating plants. 
Therefore, the comparisson of systems is significantly more informative than 
the comparing of individual technologies. This is what the “Green Energy 
Plan” illustrates.  
 
Collection of Data for Employment analyses 
The method of employment analyses seeks to examine employment and 
import effects of all sections of a production chain behind the establishment 
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of a specific energy investment. The added value step by step is found and so 
are the division into salaries and factor income. For the analysis a computer 
model has been used. A specification of a certain investment is fed into the 
model, and so are general statistics in the form of average salaries for certain 
handcraft works ect. General input/output statistics from the Danish national 
account is also used in the model. 
The collection of employment and import data is based on established 
energy investments wherever possible. The method is illustrated in the 
following with decentralized cogeneration as an example. In this case the 
data took its starting point in a 3 MW cogeneration plant built in 1990/91. 
The Plant is placed in the industrial area of a town, and was connected to an 
existing district heating system with a transmission pipe line.  
 
The plant includes three 1 MW units and a 600 m3 heat storage for the 
purpose of storing heat from electricity price highload periods to low-load 
periods. Back-up boilers already existed at the old plant and are not included 
in the price. The plant is equipped with office and meeting facilities. 
Construction prices were collected from construction accounts. (see figure 
2.11.) 
 
Engine (incl. installation)  11605 
600 m3 heat storage 990 
550 m2 building 2320 
Transformer and grid connection 905 
Ground ect. 325 
Consultancy 250 
------------- 
Sum 16395 
Figure 2.11:  Construction price 3 MW gas-engine cogeneration plant 1000 
DKK 
 
 
 
3 Gas engine units 6500 
Cooling system and exhausting exchange 571 
Sound reduction, pipes ect. 1500 
Ventilation system 215 
Management and control system 1415 
Chimney 355 
Installation 1049 
 --------------- 
Sum 11605 
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Figure 2.12: Construction price for gas-engine incl. installation 1000 DKK. 
 
The most important parts of the investment are then examined in more detail, 
while other parts are based on general statistics. In this case the engine incl. 
installation and the building were analysed further. The engine enterprise 
was divided into investmentparts as shown in figure 2.12 and the building as 
shown in figure 2.13 
 
Bricks ect 26,600 
Concrete ect. 93,000 
Mortar 6,000 
Carpenter materials 196,000 
Iron 24,000 
Metal material 40,000 
Electrical articles 152,167 
Pipes and fittings 67,801 
Digging and drain 40,000 
--------------- 
Sum 645,568 
Bricklayer 224,452 
Electrician 53,184 
Blacksmith 67,200 
Carpenter 61,272 
--------------- 
Sum 406,108 
 
Sum 1,051,676 
Figure 2.13:  Construction price for parts of the building works DKK. 
 
On the basis of the shown division of the construction prices and general 
input/output statistics the investment in a 3 MW cogeneration plant has been 
analysed and results in figure 2.14. 
 
Import 37 
Added value (Danish) 48 
Production factor income 15 
------- 
Sum 101 
Figure 2.14:  Import and added Danish value: 3 MW cogeneration unit, 
percent 
 
The investment is also found to result in the employment shown in figure 
2.15. 
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                   Construction   Production     Total 
Trainee  0.01        0.10      0.11 
Unskilled  0.15        0.42      0.57 
Skilled  0.17        0.45      0.62 
Functionaries  0.16        0.64      0.80 
 
Sum  0.49        1.61      2.10 
Figure 2.15:  Employment: 3 MW cogeneration unit (Person year per million 
DKK) 
 
Analysis of the environmental effects of energy investments. 
“We must change the economic and financial methods of calculation in 
order to estimate the social and environmental effects of our decisions. “, 
Ismail Serageldin, Vice Precident, the World Bank (Kristeligt Dagblad, 19. 
December 1997). It is increasingly necessary to analyse the environmental 
effects of energy investments. The global warming problem is looked upon 
as increasingly serious. Consequently some financial institutions, as for 
instance the World Bank, demand environmental assessment analyses in the 
feasibility studies they require before giving loans to new projects. Although 
there has been no real consensus on a world scale about how to handle this 
problem, it is difficult to imagine that such international measures will not be 
taken within the next 20-30 years. This means that it is not conceivable that 
international measures against increased greenhouse gas emissions will be 
taken within the technical lifetime of most energy projects. The SESAM 
model calculates the greenhouse gas emissions linked to the different 
scenarios. 
 
 
 
Time priority 
When dealing with energy projects, which often can be characterized as long 
term infrastructural projects, treatment of over time payments is important. 
The interest rate used in the calculations expresses the weight with which the 
future is treated. An easy way to handle this question is to simply use the 
market interest rate for the calculationsObviously this might be the only 
sound solution, when dealing with the investments of private organizations. 
Other considerations must be taken into account, when deciding which 
interest should be used, when estimating the feasibility of different regional 
or national energy strategies. Figure 2.16 shows a present value index of oil 
saved 20 years from now. 
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Figure 2.16:  Index showing the present value of oil saved 20 years from 
now for different interest rates. 
 
With a 0% interest rate, one litre saved 20 years from now has the same 
value in the calculations, as one litre saved tomorrow. With an interest rate of 
4% the value has decreased to less than 50%, and with 10% interest, the 
value of a litre of oil saved in 20 years is only given the value of around 
200g oil saved tomorrow. That is how an interest rate functions in our 
calculations. Furthermore the interest rate used for our calculation is not 
neutral regarding its effects upon comparisons between different 
technologies. The following example illustrates this. We have three 
investments: 
a) Continued oil consumption costing 10000 Dkr/year. 
b) Investing 70000 Dkr and halving the oil consumption to 5000 Dkr/år. 
c) Investing 150000 Dkr. and bringing the oil consumption down to zero. 
In figure 2.17. the present value for these three investments is shown for 
different interest rates. 
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Figure 2.17:  The interdependence between interest rate and project 
priority. 
 
We here see, that at an interest rate up to around 3,2%, 100% energy 
conservation has the lowest cost. Between 3,2% and 5,4%, a 50% decrease in 
oil consumption is advantageous, and above interest rates higher than 5,4% 
continued oil consumption is the most economical solution. The example 
reveals, that the level of an interest rate used in the calculations will have 
decisive influence upon our selection of solutions.  
 
It is one of the basic assumptions in the theory of investment analysis, that 
the investments compared should be comparable over a relevant time 
horizon. Therefore, to use a market interest at a level of 5-7%, when 
calculating the socioeconomical feasibility of a a long term infrastructural 
investment is problematic, when dealing with technologies using different 
rates of scarce resources, and having different levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Such technologies are not comparable over a longer time horizon. 
And the above differences usually exists when energy scenarios are 
compared .  
Obviously it is difficult to use an interest rate which is lower than the market 
interest rate, as it requires liquidity in a starting period to do so. But it should 
be done, and in Denmark a way of compensating for this interest problem 
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has, been to give a subsidy in the initial phases of the introduction of 
renewable energy technologies and when investing in energy conservation 
technologies. 
 
Conclusion:  
a)  using a rather high interest rate is acceptable (7-10%) when comparing 
investments with the same level of pollution and use of scarce resources. 
b)  using a much lower interest is necessary (0-3%), when comparing 
investments with different levels of pollution and use of scarce resources. 
 
Impacts of historic investments (sunk costs) 
The socioeconomic costs in the future are not the only costs which determine 
whether an energy scenario is feasible or not. The costs of the past, which 
are built into the present technological systems have a significant influence 
upon the way in which one should invest in order to reach the goals for the 
energy systems of the future. Using a picture from sailing, it is important to 
know your point of departure, when you travel to any desired destination. 
But it is important that the desired destination governs your voyage, and not 
the point of departure. 
 
In energy planning we often deal with large and consolidated technical and 
organizational systems with a very high level of “sunk costs“ regarding 
technical and organizational investments. A precise knowledge of the “point 
of departure “ situation is essential for a successful travel to the desired 
destinations. Nevertheless there is a strong tendency, that “the point of 
departure” determines the destination, instead of just being the “point of 
departure” for destinations decided by the travellers. Said with words from 
the energy scene, there is, for instance, a strong tendency, that capital 
intensive energy systems establish price structures which bind the customers 
to a high level of consumption by means of a system of price differentiation 
and high fixed tariffs. This makes energy conservation measures 
uneconomical, and impedes the “travel” towards the destination “energy 
conservation”.  
Invested capital is often regarded as “sunk costs” which is regarded as 
having the cost of zero, when competing with energy alternatives. It is 
correct, from a static point of view, to use zero as the price of this type of 
sunk costs, but in reality there are always repair costs linked to such systems. 
When applying a dynamic point of view, it is important to include, in the 
feasibility studies, the long term replacement capital costs of the existing 
technical and organizational systems. If this is not done, “the point of 
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departure” will determine the destination, and there will be no real strategic 
development process at the energy scene. 
 
The conclusion is that in feasibility studies it is important to use a long time 
horizon and to make calculations which compare the long term marginal 
costs of the alternatives. In this way it is possible to make sure that the short 
term marginal cost structure of the existing energy systems do not 
completely dominate the calculations and determine the energy strategy. 
 
Technological development 
It is well known, that technologies are more expensive in an initial phase of 
the technological development than in a more mature phase. This has been 
the case with the windpower development in Denmark, where the price pr. 
Kwh produced has gone down with a factor 2-3 since the beginning of the 
eighties, and where prognoses estimate a further 20-40% decrease in the 
prices before the year 2010. By then windpower based electricity is supposed 
to be almost as cheap as oil and coal for power production. The same 
tendency has been seen within the development of district heating systems 
and to some extent within solar heating systems and biogas plants. 
 
When making a long term socioeconomic feasibility study, it is a difficult 
question to assess the future prices of energy technologies in the different 
scenarios. But it should be kept in mind that estimates which do not include 
relative price decreases on the newcomer technologies, are biased and more 
often than not result in an overestimation of the prices of new technologies. 
 
Nor is it easy to estimate the innovative processes which can be started, 
when introducing new technology lines in a development process. When the 
Danish windpower industry started from almost nothing twenty years ago, 
nobody in any Danish feasibility study foresaw that windpower development 
would result in a large advanced industry within a period of 10-20 years, 
with around 10000 employed and an export amounting to 6 billion DKK. 
We have no specific methods to use when estimating future prices of 
newcomer technologies, and their impacts on the technology development 
process in a country. Nevertheless we think that this point is one of the most 
important in a socioeconomic feasibility study, and we recommend that it is 
given a place and discussion in the structure of such studies.  
The risk dimension 
Energy systems are mostly long term and capital intensive. Some 
organization or group of persons have invested large amounts of money in 
power plants, transmission grids, district heating systems, natural gas 
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pipelines, energy efficient houses, etc. which may last technically for 20-50 
years. 
The return of capital is dependant upon an array of conditions such as the 
development of fossil fuel prices, consumption, new competing 
technologies, inability to pay the bills, environmental problems, 
liberalization of the markets, etc. etc. This combination of capital 
intensitivity and a very turbulent development, makes investment in energy 
systems a very risky business, if companies are not able to foresee or control 
some risk areas. Socioeconomic feasibility studies should include: 
a) A map of the risk areas. 
b) A discussion of the background of those risk areas. 
c) Sensibility studies calculating the consequences of different risk 
scenarios. 
d) Investment redesign to be able to react on risks. 
e) A warning system with a systematic description of risk indicators. 
 Chapter 3 
Examples of Feasibility Studies in Practise 
The following two examples from Denmark will be shown in order to 
illustrate some of the main conclusions in chapter 1 and chapter 2 regarding 
the design and implementation of feasibility studies. The “Green Energy 
Plan” case shows how feasibility studies for a “whole country” energy 
strategy is designed. And it especially shows how systematic analyses of the 
goals and situation of the country influence the structure as well as the 
content of a socioeconomic feasibility study. Once more it is illustrated, that 
there is no such thing as one universal model regarding the structure and 
contents of socioeconomic feasibility studies, but that such studies should be 
adapted to the concrete situation. In “Danish Biogas Strategy” we focus upon 
the necessity of making systematic www- and Diamond-E analyses  by 
discussing the different results of two reports made for the Danish energy 
administration.  
 
 
3.1 A Green Energy Plan  
“Elements of a Green Energy Plan” (Lund 1996) was an input to the public 
debate on the future of energy in Denmark in the spring of 1996. The 
Ministry for Energy had determined the frame of reference for this debate by 
presenting two courses of development: everything or nothing! If Denmark 
does "nothing", we cannot achieve the environmental goals. If Denmark does 
"everything" we can achieve more than these goals. For some specific 
proposals the Plan has calculated what can be done. The primary aim is that 
new employment can be created by doing something to reach the 
environmental goals, and it is possible to do this in  a way that has no 
adverse effect on the balance of payments. 
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This case shows  
• that it is possible to find energy strategies which both improve the 
balance of payment, the employment , the environment and the public 
finance account and the gross national product  
• that there does not have to be a contradiction between economy and 
environment 
• that it is possible to develop energy strategies, where improved 
environment and improved economy goes hand in hand 
• that this can only be done by making systematic socioeconomic 
feasibility studies, where what, whom and why analyses (Step 1, www-
analysis) are systematically discussed and combined with thorough 
Diamond-E analyses (Step 2 analysis). 
 
The Green Energy Plan consists of a number of initiatives, which Denmark 
can choose to implement, as a supplement to the official energy policies. The 
choice of elements in the Plan is made on the basis of a total evaluation of 
environment, economics, the rate of foreign exchange, consumption and 
employment. Primarily, the aim is to enable Denmark to continue to obtain 
the reduction of CO2 emissions. This is  achieved by means of long-term, 
investment dependant alterations in the infrastructure, towards a more 
decentralised energy system. The changes in question will require 
investments, but these will provide an improved employment situation and a 
better environment. 
Regarding the www-analysis the “what” consists of long term energy system 
scenarios. And these scenarios are supposed to be used by the Government 
(“whom”) as a tool for the establishment of an energy strategy, which can 
fulfill the goals of the Government ( “why”).  
 
The Green Energy Plan does not compare a number of individual 
technologies in an undescribed system, but rather compares a packet of 
solutions in a well-defined system. In this way it can be ensured that two 
alternatives with the same capabilities, i.e. the ability to meet the Danish 
energy requirements in the period up to the year 2015, are being compared. 
Only in this way  will it be possible to reach a conclusion with reasonable 
accuracy about the effects on employment. 
 
The Plan is compared with the official energy policies, as they appeared in 
Spring, 1995, when the calculations were made. At that point in time, the 
Danish Energy Agency assessed that the carrying out of "Implementation of 
Energy 2000" would be insufficient to achieve Parliament's adopted aim for 
a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions by the year 2005 (compared with year 
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1988). The reduction would only be 14%. Therefore, the calculation focuses 
on illustrating how a total implementation of all the elements in the Green 
Energy Plan could ensure that Denmark  obtains the 20% reduction in CO2 
emission by the year 2005, and also continues on the way to further 
improvement by the year 2015. 
 
The elements in the Green Energy Plan are examples of what could be done 
in order to  effectuate a reduction in CO2 emissions - both a 20% reduction 
by the year 2005, and a further reduction in the following years. The Plan 
contains the following elements: 
- Conversion from electrical heating, in areas without a supply of district 
heating and natural gas 
- A general activity  to improve insulation, including in the larger urban 
areas where low temperature district heating can be established 
- Change from individual natural gas fired boilers to cogeneration district 
heating 
- Decentralised use of straw and wood fuels 
- Development of community biogas plants 
- 3000 MW produced by wind generators in the year 2015 
- 20% reduction in electricity consumption in the industrial sector by 
means of employee training 
The Plan has the implementation of the above-mentioned elements in the 
course of a 20 year period, from 1996 to 2015.  
 
The Green Energy Plan is compared with the Reference on the basis that the 
Green Energy Plan is implemented in the period from 1996 to 2015, both 
years included. Detailed technical calculations are made for the years 2005 
and 2015 on the basis that  half  the above mentioned measures will be 
implemented by the year 2005, and all of them by 2015. 
From a Diamond-E analysis it is known  that the aims of the Government 
among others are to improve the environmental situation, GDP, balance of 
payment and employment and the public finance account. Consequently the 
socioeconomic feasibility study has to study the effects of the energy 
scenarios upon the fulfilment of these goals. That is the reason for this 
socioeconomic feasibility study to focus upon environment, foreign 
exchange , employment and the public finance accounts. 
Furthermore it is known from the Diamond-E analysis  that Denmark has 
250,000-300,000 unemployed people, and that they may be regarded as 
aresource in the process of achieving all the aims mentioned.. 
In comparison with the Reference the Green Energy Plan provides the 
following consequences: 
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Environment and fuel consumption 
The total fuel consumption in the Danish energy sector (excluding transport) 
will be reduced by 5% in the year 2005 and fossil fuels will be reduced by 
9%. When fuel consumption for transport is included, it means that CO2 
emissions will be reduced by 20% in the year 2005, in comparison with 
1988. In 2015 the Green Energy Plan proposes an additional reduction of 
CO2 emission by 34% in comparison with 1988. 
 
New power generation capacity 
In addition to two power stations which are already under construction, the 
Reference requires two more power generating stations of 400 MW to be 
constructed before the year 2005, and a further six or sevenin the period 
from 2005 to 2015. 
In the Green Energy Planthe the following elements:  
- increased development of decentralised cogeneration,  
- low temperature district heating in larger urban areas,  
- energy conservation in the industrial sector  
- and replacement of electric heating, 
prove that there is no need for the construction of new power production 
capacity (except for those under construction) until 2015. 
 
Costs, foreign exchange and employment 
In the case of constant fuel prices the Green Energy Plan would increase the 
total costs from DKK 27 billion p.a. to DKK 32 billion p.a. (not including 
taxes or subsidies). This is largely owing to the increased investments. 
Foreign exchange consumption would have a minor rise in the beginning 
(DKK 0.7 billion p.a. in 1996) but would fall thereafter, so that in 2015 there 
would be a foreign exchange saving (DKK 0.6 billion p.a. in 2015). In the 
case of minor increases in fuel prices (according to the latest forecasts from 
the Danish Energy Agency, where prices rise 25 to 50%), the additional 
expenditures would fall to approximately DKK 4 billion p.a., and the savings 
in foreign exchange would be DKK 1.4 billion p.a. in 2015. 
Thus, the Green Energy Plan involves a number of additional Danish 
investments. In the reorientation period the effect of the Plan on the balance 
of payments would be largely neutral. 
Regardless of fuel prices, the reference continues with an employment 
parameter of slightly less than 40,000 persons. The implementation of the 
Green Energy Plan would increase employment by approximately 12,000 
persons in 1996 and rise to additional employment for approximately 17,000 
persons in 2015. 
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Public finance accounts 
In the model, a calculation has been made for the net effect on the public 
finances, according to the following: 
 
+ Reduced social and unemployment benefit 
+ Increased revenue from income tax 
+ Increased revenue from company tax 
+ Secondary effects 
- Reduced revenue from energy levies 
- Reduced surplus contributions from natural gas companies 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----- 
 Changes in the public accounts 
====================================================== 
 
The calculation includes the increased taxation revenues and reduced social 
benefit payments, the reductions in energy levies and the results on the 
profits of the natural gas companies (which in Denmark are owned by the 
State and municipalities). Furthermore, the secondary effects from the 
increased turnovers in the national community are included. A Danish 
subsidy of between 0,10 and 0,27 DKK/kWh to electricity produced from 
renewable energy and decentralized cogeneration is calculated on the basis 
that the present level remains constant, until the year 2005, thereafter being 
gradually reduced to 50% in 2015. 
The calculations are detailed in the case of the consequences on revenues 
and public service contribution charges in the natural gas companies. With 
reference to the secondary effects, an estimate rather than a detailed 
calculation has been made. The calculation is based on an income multiplier, 
as well as  tax and import quota, which are difficult to estimate in a forecast 
for 20 years. Therefore, round figures have been chosen. Small variations in 
the contributions from the secondary effects are not decisive for the main 
conclusion. 
The efficiency is calculated as the difference between the implementation of 
the one or the other scenario, i.e. the Reference compared with the Green 
Energy Plan. Changes in the individual items of the public accounts are 
calculated for the direct and the secondary effects. The following variables 
are specified as input to the calculations: 
Average social/unemployment benefits   DKK 110,000 p.a. 
Average wage         220,000 DKK p.a.  
Marginal income tax (personnel)      50% 
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Marginal income tax (company)     40%  
Marginal import quota       30% 
Multiplier         1.2 
The main result is shown in figure 3.1 for the calculation with constant fuel 
prices expressed as the consequences of implementing the Green Energy 
Plan, rather than the Reference. Rising fuel prices do not alter the final 
results to any great extent. 
 
It should be emphasised that the above means of showing the consequences 
for the public finances, presuppose that the employments of the 12,000 to 
17,000 additional persons  cause neither bottleneck problems nor rising 
wages. At present, as seen in the Diamond-E analysis, there are 250,000 to 
300,000 unemployed in Denmark, although employment figures have 
improved recently. In such a situation, the public sector should be careful 
about taking initiatives that would lead to an overheated economy. The 
above calculation will not be valid, if, within the period, a situation arises 
with more or less full employment. In such a situation, the same advantages 
would not be achieved by substituting fuel imports with Danish employment. 
 
Billion DKK Year 2005 Year 2015 
Additional costs 
Foreign exchange costs 
Employment effect 
4.7 
0.2 
13000 
5.2 
-0.6 
18000 
Reduced benefits 
Increased tax 
Natural gas company deficit 
Reduced energy levies 
Energy subsidies 
Secondary effects 
+1.5 
+1.3 
-0.2 
-1.1 
-1.1 
+0.6 
+2.0 
+1.7 
-0.5 
-1.4 
-1.4 
+0.8 
Effect on public finances +1.0 +1.2 
Figure 3.1:  Green Energy Plan Net Effect on the Public Finances, not 
including public regulation costs 
 
 
 
Consumer economics and public regulation costs 
An estimate has been made for the public operational costs for the State, in 
the implementation of the Plan. The starting point has been that consumer 
prices (total energy costs for households and industry) remain the same, in 
the Green Energy Plan and in the Reference. Thus, it is an attempt to 
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calculate how much the public finances will have to contribute, in order to 
maintain the average purchasing power and competitiveness, at the same 
level in the two alternatives. 
We refer to the publication, "Democracy and Change, Energy Action Plan 
1996" (Hvelplund, 1995) for a more detailed description of which means 
would be of special importance. Below is listed a number of important 
measures to be taken to allow a cost estimate. 
 
The public regulation means are: 
- Changes in the regulation of electricity tariffs 
- Prohibition of the use of electrical residential space heating after the year 
2000 
- Specifically aimed subsidies 
- Improved insulation standards for houses offered for sale 
- Continuation of the CO2 levy and the subsidies for sustainable energy 
(but with a gradual reduction so that the subsidies would be reduced by 
50% through a 20 years period) 
- Demand for the conversion from individual consumption of natural gas to 
a cogeneration of electrical power and district heating supplies 
- Training programmes in electricity saving for industrial employees 
- More research, e.g. in straw gasification 
- Subsidies for biogas and gasification plants 
 
According to the Green Energy Plan an implementation of these measures 
would cost the public finances approximately DKK 1.3 billion p.a.. Thus, 
these costs are similar to the expected increase in revenue to the public 
finances. 
 
Therefore, there are good possibilities of implementing the Green Energy 
Plan in such a way that it would have an almost neutral effect on the public 
finances. 
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Total assessment 
On the minus side, mention must be made of: 
- extra investment costs in the period of change of approximately DKK 5 
billion p.a. 
- extra foreign exchange costs of approximately DKK 0.7 billion in the 
beginning (although the costs would fall to between minus DKK 0.6 
billion and minus DKK 1.4 billion depending on the development in the 
fuel prices) 
 
On the plus side, mention must be made of: 
- reduced foreign exchange consumption in 2015 of between DKK 0.6 
billion and minus DKK 1.4 billion depending on the development in the 
fuel prices (although there would be higher foreign exchange costs in the 
first few years) 
- CO2 reduction of 20% instead of 14% in the year 2005 (and a reduction 
of 34% instead of 20% in 2015) 
- reduced fuel consumption 
- additional employment of approximately 12,000 persons in 1995 and 
rising to approximately 17,000 in 2015 
- better capital goods in 2015 
- district heating to 50% of the Danish households 
- biogas and straw gasification plants corresponding to 35 PJ gas p.a. 
- decentralised cogeneration plants for 4000 MW (although fewer 
central plants) 
- central heating in all houses 
- an improved insulation standard in the large urban areas 
- better trained industrial workers 
- more wind generators 
The value of the additional capital goods in 2015 can be estimated at 
approximately DKK 80 billion in 1995 DKK as new purchase price. The 
average age at that time would be 10 years, and the expected operational 
lifespan would be 20 to 30 years. Therefore, the value would be 
approximately DKK 50 billion. It should be emphasised that the possible 
effects on exports of developing such new technologies as wind generation, 
biogas, straw gasification, decentralised cogeneration, etc., are not included 
in the above calculation. Any expected advantage would be an additional 
advantage to the Green Energy Plan. 
 
 
 
3.2 A Danish Biogas Strategy 
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In 1990 the Danish energy administration was in a process of evaluating the 
status of the biogas development, in order to establish a new biogas 
development strategy. 15 reports were made, among which one was about 
the socioeconomic effects of biogas plants (Risø, 1991) and one was about 
biogas plants and public regulation (Lund, 1992).  
The analysis of the socioeconomic effects of biogas plants (The Risø report) 
concluded that biogas plants were not socioeconomic feasible for society. 
Why should biogas plants be supported, if they were not socioeconomic 
feasible? Why write a report on Public Regulation? It was contradictory to 
support a massive implementation of biogas plants in Denmark, if biogas 
were not socioeconomic feasible for the Danish society.  
Consequently a report was written by Aalborg University, in which it was 
both analyzed, whether it was correct that biogas were not socioeconomic 
feasible for the Danish society, and a public regulation strategy was 
described (The AAU report). The conclusion was that a biogas 
implementation scenario was socioeconomic beneficially for the Danish 
society, when seen in relation to the aims of the Danish Parliament. 
 
Finally there were two reports, one concluding that biogas is not -
socioeconomically feasible for society, and the other report coming to the 
opposite conclusion. This case deals with a description of these two reports, 
and the causes to the different conclusions. This discussion is currently 
related to the methodology developed in chapter 1 and 2. 
 
The Risø socioeconomic analysis 
The socioeconomic calculations in (Risø, 1991) are elaborated as present 
value comparisons over a time horizon of 20 years of three different existing 
biogas plants: The Fangel-, Davinde- and Lintrup biogas plants. The two first 
have oil fired district heating plants as their reference alternatives, whereas 
the Lintrup Biogas Plant has a natural gas fired district heating system as its 
reference alternative. The prices used in the calculations are market prices 
excl. Value added tax and energy taxes. The price prognoses used for fossil 
fuel are based upon the official prognoses from the Ministry of Energy. The 
results of these calculations are shown in figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Million DKK Fangel Davinde Lintrup 
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Investment  26,7 4,3 45,2 
Present value  -15,2 -5,1 -26,8 
Annual surplus -1,4 -0,5 -2,5 
Figure 3.2:  Risø Report, 1991 Socioeconomic results exclusive environ-
mental costs. 
 
As is seen, the conclusion is that the projects are not socioeconomically 
feasible, when environmental costs are excluded. Furthermore the Risø 
Report had calculations, where some environmental costs were included, i.e.  
(SO2) 14 DKK/kg, (NOx) 8 DKK/kg, (CO2) 100 DKK/ton. When including 
these environmental costs, the socioeconomic results are as illustrated in 
figure 3.3. 
 
Million DKK Fangel Davinde Lintrup 
Annual surplus -0,9 -0,4 -2,2 
Figure 3.3:  Risø Report, 1991 socioeconomic results inclusive environmen-
tal costs. 
 
As both figure 3.1 and 3.2 illustrates, the results of the Risø socioeconomic 
calculations were that biogas was not socioeconomically feasible even when 
taking the environmental cost into the calculations.  
 
The Aalborg University (AAU) calculations 
The main criticisms coming from the AAU analysis were linked to the fact, 
that the Risø calculations did not systematically analytically adapt their 
analysis to the specific situation. An adaptation which could be performed 
by systematically using the combination of www-analysis (what should be 
analysed, and for whom and why is the analysis done), and the Diamond - E 
analysis. In this case the www analysis would show the following: What 
should be studied? The socioeconomy of biogas scenarios. This means that 
the study should have a long term perspective with the study of 
technological changes as an integrated part. For whom and why? The study 
is essentially done for the Danish Parliament who wants to get information 
to be used deciding the future biogas strategy. 
 
A very short Diamond -E analysis would give the following result: 
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Regarding the organizational aims some important socioeconomic aims of 
the Danish Parliament are: 
a) Economic growth, defined as GNP growth 
b) Full employment in a period where 10% are unemployed (1990). 
c) Development of new export oriented technologies 
d) Decrease in the foreign debt in a situation, where the foreign debt is 
around 300Billion DKK. 
e) A decrease in the CO2 emission by 20% from 1988-2005. 
 
Regarding organizational resources: 
f) 10% unemployed (350,000 persons) 
g) Many small firms which are able to produce well functioning biogas 
plants  
 
Regarding the financial resources: 
h) A high level of public debt which indicates, that solutions should not 
increase this problem. 
 
Regarding the natural and socioeconomic environment: 
i) CO2 reduction in Denmark is a must in a country with the third highest 
CO2 emission pr inhabitant in EU, due to the extensive use of coal in 
electricity production. 
 
This analysis revealsthat energy solutions which increase employment, 
decrease importation, decrease pollution and increase GNP are important in 
order to fulfill the aims of Parliament. They also tell us that labour is a rather 
abundant resource, as there was an unemployment mounting to 350,000 in 
1990.  
 
When going back to the Risø study, it is important to note, that this study has 
as the presumption of full employment, and that foreign debt is no problem. 
In all the calculations positive effects upon technological development, 
balance of payment, state finance and employment was given no value, 
although such effects are given high priorities in the aims of the Danish 
Parliament.  
As a consequence of this, the AAU study included these effects in its 
socioeconomic analyses. In these analyses calculations were made regarding 
a biogas scenario (50%), assuming that 50% of the all manure in Denmark 
from cattle, pigs and poultry is used for biogas production. The outcome of 
this analysis is shown in figure 3.4. 
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 Example 1: 
(0 million DKK 
extra tax pr year) 
Example 2: 
(1500 million DKK 
extra tax pr. year) 
Example 3: 
(750 million DKK 
extra tax pr. year) 
Gross National  
Product 
(Million DKK/Year) 
 
+ 1000 
 
0 
 
+ 500 
Employment effects 
(Persons) 
 
+ 5000 
 
0 
 
+ 2500 
State finance 
(Million DKK/Year) 
 
+ 200 
 
+ 1200 
 
+ 700 
Balance of payment 
(Million DKK/Year) 
 
+ 300 
 
+ 900 
 
+ 600 
Figure 3.4:  AAU study: Three examples of consequences of biogas scenario 
(50%) 
 
The three examples are different in the way that example 2 includes 1500 
million DKK in extra tax, in order to establish a situation, where the total 
buying power and production are constant. Example 3 has exactly the same 
biogas scenario, but with only 750 in extra tax. Example 1 has no extra tax at 
all. The three examples just show the different possibilities, the politicians 
have, when they have decided to support the biogas scenario(50%). 
 
The positive socioeconomic effects are mainly caused by: 
-  Saved import due to decrease in oil and coal imports. 
-  Increased employment because of the high employment effects linked to 
building, maintaining and running biogas plant. 
-  Increased incomes and consequently increased taxes, which improve the 
state finance. This increased provenue to the state budget more than 
compensates the subsidies which have to be given to motivate the 
construction of biogas plants. 
 
The resource and environmental effects are described in figure 3.5. Figure 
3.5. shows that when relating the socioeconomic feasibility of biogas to the 
goals of Parliament, the biogas scenario (50%) gives a higher economic and 
environmental performance on all important areas. When including the 
employment effects, balance of payment effects and effects on the state 
finances, this scenario therefore is very feasible from a socioeconomic point 
of view.  
The calculations of Risø were right seen in isolation. It was, and probably 
still is correct that biogas plants have not yet reached a stage, where they are 
economically feasible with the existing market prices. But seen from the 
viewpoint of the Government, and this is the relevant standpoint in this case, 
the above biogas scenario (50%) is socioeconomically feasible, as it pursues 
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and satisfies some essential governmental aims. The www - and Diamond-E 
analysis were used in order to establish the context in relation to which 
relevance should be measured. The Risø calculations were not wrong, but 
irrelevant in the specific calculation context. 
 
 Biogas scenario 
(50%) 
Reference: Oil for heat 
and coal for electricity. 
Environmental  
advantage of biogas 
Total fuel  
consumption  
(TJ/year) 
 
16196 
 
18720 
 
Fossil fuel  
consumption 
(TJ/year) 
    468 18720 18252 
CO2 emission  
(1000 ton/year) 
      34    1494  1460 
SO2 emission 
(ton/year) 
    470    5840  5370 
NOx emission  
(ton/year) 
  2780  2783 - 
Figure 3.5:  AAU study: The resource and environmental effects of the 
biogas (50%) scenario. 
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 Chapter 4 
Public Regulation 
The important thing is the context. Some kinds of public regulation are 
suitable in certain institutional setups and others are not. Quite often public 
regulation is discussed without taken in the context. In economic theory it is 
normally discussed whether tax and subsidies are better or worse than 
administrative means. Such discussions rarely include a detailed description 
of the specific social and institutional context, in which the public 
regulations are supposed to function. The society is described by use of 
macro-economic models, where organisations and institutions are constant 
over a long-term period. In such models Society is constituted by existing 
static energy organisations, static rules of financing, static agreements of 
electricity sale to the grid from decentralized cogeneration, static education 
systems etc.  
 
The implementation of radical technological changes such as those described 
in chapter 1 depends on  the public regulation also addressing the 
organisational and institutional circumstances. Very often this is forgotten. It 
is characteristical for the division of public regulation into economical or 
administrative measuress that strategies for implementing organisational and 
institutional changes  are not established. And such strategies are important 
when political objectives of reducing CO2 emission are to be implemented at 
the lowest socioeconomic costs. Only the changes that will not change the 
existing organisations in a society with a constant institutional setup are 
considered. 
 
In chapter 1 is was found that Public Regulation analysis should: 
-  analyse not only regulation by means of taxes and subsidies, but also 
regulation by developing new institutions around the market. 
-  be aware of the asymmetry of financial power between the old fossil fuel-
based technologies, and the new energy conservation technologies. Public 
regulation measures may not require subsidies for the new technologies, 
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but just equal terms with regard to financial possibilities, by removing the 
capital advantages of the existing energy companies. 
-  be aware of the asymmetry of political power between the old fossil fuel-
based technologies and the new energy conservation technologies. Quite 
often it is necessary to create organisations within research, price and 
monopoly control, advisory comities, and funding, which are totally 
independent of the established fossil fuel companies.  
 
Based on the description of market economy and the character of 
technological change in chapter 1 this chapter will lead to a check list of 
public regulation measures suitable for implementing such new technologies.  
1. Firstly the political phases of introducing new technologies are described, 
when such technologies meet resistance from the established 
organisations.  
2. Then the kind of public regulation are described which are needed in 
order to develop the existing organisations and institutions. 
3. Finally a check list of public regulation is given. 
 
 
4.1 The Political Phases of Technological Change 
Any radical technological change will meet resistance from the established 
organisations and institutional infrastructure of the market. This struggle 
between the existing and the new technologies tends to vary depending on 
the kind of new radical technology  introduced. The introduction of natural 
gas in Denmark became a radical change in the sense that important new 
organisations were established. A new organisation was formed with a new 
product sold from few single-purpose companies to individual consumers. 
Thus, one more organisation could be added to the existing electricity and 
district heating companies. Of course the introduction of natural gas was met 
with resistance from the established organisations, but natural gas did not 
have to go through a number of phases in which certain technical 
specifications or the potential were put in doubt. Contrary to that a change 
into manyfold energy systems based on differentiated solutions from many 
different and multipurpose organisations have quite different characteristics, 
and therefore invariably go through a number of different resistance phases 
from the existing organisations. 
 
 
 
In the following a number of typical phases are described. The phases are 
numbered. Often new technologies will have to undergo all phases by the 
67 
numbers. It should, however, be emphasized that the phases may intervene 
and sometimes a technology, after passing phase 5, may be pushed 
backwards to phase 2 again etc. 
 
Phase 1: The struggle of defining the problem. 
Very often defining the problem contains the solution itself. This may be 
illustrated by a subject such as "electricity consumption for cooling". The 
problem may be defined as providing a given cooling capacity with given 
efficiency with the cheapest possible electricity. In this case the solution 
could be obtained by a power station with better efficiency. On the other 
hand the problem might just as well be defined as providing a certain cooling 
capacity at the lowest possible costs. In this case the solution could be found 
by a low energy refrigerator in combination with a smaller power station. Or 
the problem could be defined as providing consumers with fresh  goods. 
Now the solution could be a smaller low energy refrigerator plus an even 
smaller power station plus shorter transportation of consumer goods. Or the 
problem could be expanded to include both fresh consumer goods and house 
heating at the lowest possible costs. Now the solution could be a low energy 
refrigerator plus decentralized cogeneration etc. Economical interests are 
linked to any definition of the problem. This definition is very important to 
the choice of solution and thereby the production system which will have the 
profits. 
 
Phase 2: The struggle of getting at the agenda 
Sometimes new technologies are excluded from the political agenda, which 
in an introductory phase is essential, because the public discussion is more or 
less the only place (virtual technology) where the brand new technologies 
exist in this phase. In Denmark such exclusion was carried out in the case of 
decentralized cogeneration based on natural gas for a period of almost 10 
years. The technology was simply  ignored in any technical report published 
by the established companies.  
 
Phase 3: The struggle of being recognized as technically possible 
In this phase the new technology will be met by the question of whether the 
technology or the technical systems can be established from a technical 
and/or practical point of view. In Denmark the wind turbine was met with 
this question until 1978, the biogas production plants and the electricity 
conservation until the early 1980ies, and decentralized cogeneration until 
1990. As an example the established electricity companies tried to say that 
the energy system in the government energy plan “Energy 2000" from 1990 
could not become reality due to purely technical reasons.  
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Phase 4: The struggle of being recognized as considerable 
In this phase the new technology will be met by the statement: "OK, it is 
possible from a technical point of view, but the potential is so small that 
political reform work is not worth while”. This was the case for 
decentralized cogeneration until 1989. In official reports made for the 
government by the established companies the technical potential of 
decentralized cogeneration was calculated to 450 MW at the highest. Today 
a much higher result has already been reached, but for a period the 
established companies managed to exclude this technology from the political 
agenda. Thus for a number of years decentralized cogeneration was not 
included in fuel saving energy strategies, because the potential did not matter 
much. 
 
Phase 5: The struggle of being economically feasible 
"The technology is not feasible from a socioeconomic point of view" is an 
argument which will often appear in the first 4 phases. This argument is 
sometimes correct, sometimes wrong, and sometimes it is impossible to 
answer. The argument will very often be emphasized after a technology has 
passed the first 4 phases. In Denmark major electricity savings in households 
and in industries have recently passed the first phases and for a couple of 
years they have been met with the argument that they are not feasible 
because of "high transaction costs". The savings, however, are feasible but 
because it is expensive to locate area for the savings, the whole project is 
considered not feasible. Decentralized cogeneration was considered not 
feasible until 1989, when this barrier was surmounted. For the time being 
decentralized biomass gasification is considered not feasible and therefore 
plans are that biomass should be incinerated in big power stations. The 
socioeconomic feasibility in the latter is not good either, but this solution has 
big companies in its support. It is obvious that only the new technologies 
have to pass the test of phase 5. Established technologies with established 
organisations do not have to pass the test. For example the decision of 
building another new coal-fired power station in North Jutland was not  
subject to any socioeconomic evaluation. 
 
 
 
Phase 6: The struggle of the decision arena 
Particularly in the case of a radical technological change the opportunities of 
new technologies are a function of the national energy policy. As described 
in chapter 1 the market is not "a free market" without barriers of penetration. 
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The implementation of new technologies will depend on certain changes in 
the institutions of the market. For example decentralized cogeneration did 
not really start before regulations were constituted for the sale of electricity 
to the public grid, and a "subsidy" of 10 øre/kWh was introduced. Several of 
the  institutional changes necessary will have to be introduced at a national 
level. At this level Parliament will be a major decision making arena. It is 
often quite difficult to control this arena unless one can manage to influence 
the written material  which form the basis on which the decisions are made. 
The struggle of influencing such material is difficult for many differentiated 
small scale technologies, because it is more difficult for them to have a 
common lobby organisation to influene committees set down by the energy 
authorities. 
 
Phase 7: The struggle of implementation 
By making the official Danish energy plan "Energy 21" Parliament 
recognized the need for a radical technology change at the strategic level. 
But such change needs follow-up by various institutional changes, which are 
quite complicated and therefore possible to impede at the tactical level. One 
way of doing this is to expand the well-established technologies (such as 
coal fired steam turbines in Denmark) by use of the well-established 
organisations (such as the power companies in Denmark). Another way of 
slowing down the introduction of new technologies is to conquer the 
implementation. "If such new technologies mustbe implemented, then let us 
do it. In that way we control the rate and the tempo". In the implementation 
phase the established organisations are typically very strong as they have 
access to money, know-how etc. In spite of this advantage a number of 
examples show that very often the established organisations have difficulties 
in implementing radical changes. In Denmark this came out clear in the 
windpower program carried out by the electrical power companies during 
the 1980ies. The power companies tried to build big wind turbines from the 
very start. The result of that program seemed only to be a demonstration of 
the problems concerned with windpower and not the solutions the 
technology might bring. Fortunately a number of individuals and small scale 
wind turbine industries developed the technology at the same time. They 
managed to prove the feasibility of windpower in production of electricity. 
 
Phase 8: The struggle of surviving 
A new technology may run through all the former 7 phases and then again 
slowly be squeezedout by the established organisations. Maybe windpower 
in Denmark is  presently being exposed to such a pressure . Windpower has 
been unpopular on locations in which the power companies and the 
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authorities have enforced the establishment of wind farms against the will of 
local residents. Also, the insulation of houses may be squeezedout in the 
future. The substantial Danish expansion of district heating in combination 
with regulation rules resulting in a high percentage of fixed costs might lead 
to stop the implementation of heat savings. 
 
 
4.2 The Development of Institutional Infrastructures 
With political objectives that result in the need for new organisations within 
the energy sector there is a need to include in the discussions of public 
regulation  the issue of institutional and organisational change. By this is 
meant either change of existing organisations or the establishment of new 
organisations. The situation makes it necessary to change views on public 
regulation. Radical changes in technology cannot be implemented solely by 
changes in a universe of static institutions and organisations. Public 
Regulation must address and develop the institutions themselves.  
 
An institution can be defined as "a set of circumstances or rules for 
transactions" (Hernes 1972). Thus, such institutions determine the 
development of a number of given organisations in the market. The 
conception of institution may be better explained by adding the word 
infrastructure and by describing the following characteristics: 
- Investments in institutional infrastructures have a longer time horizon 
than investments made by individual actors on the market. 
- Investments in institutional infrastructures have a larger space than the 
investments of individual actors. The investments are meant for more 
than one actor. 
- The costs of institutional infrastructures are paid for by others than the 
individual actor or organisation. 
Institutional infrastructures can be anything from educational systems to 
hardware physical infrastructures such as roads or district heating systems. 
The institutional infrastructures are  part of both established private and 
public organisations.They function as a kind of historical inertia formed by 
former major investments designed and influenced at the strategic level. 
 
In an analysis of public regulation one may place oneself in one of the 
following categories: 
- Both institutional infrastructure and established organisations may be 
considered constant. 
- Institutional infrastructures may be considered variable while the 
established organisations are considered constant. 
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- Both institutional infrastructure and established organisations may be 
considered variable. 
In the case of need for radical technological changes such as described in 
chapter 1, both institutional infrastructure and established organisations 
should be considered variable. Organisation and institutional developing 
public regulation must make sure that a development of new organisations 
and new institutions can evolve. But such institutional and organisational 
preconditions do not evolve in the market automatically. Normally strong 
interests linked to existing power companies will try to impede the 
development of any institutions which support competing technology. The 
political process therefore has to be independent of these companies, and 
strong enough to establish the new market conditions mentioned above. 
 
The established companies do not have the innovation capability required. 
Often a technological change results in loss of market shares of the old 
companies. Therefore, the political process has to be independent of the 
existing organisations and strong enough to establish new rules that might 
diminish the market shares of the existing companies. This is a severe 
requirement. For instance, the EU has heavy problems with this requirement 
due to the lack of openness in the Commission regarding the members of 
advisory committees and to the lack of any efficient legislation regarding 
lobbyism. To further the political strength and independency needed, the 
following preconditions should be stabilized: 
-  Tariffs and costs in the established companies should be more transparent 
to the public. By "the public" we mean any citizen and not just another 
public commission. 
-  The abolition of links between established companies and the State and 
the municipal economy. The economy of individual politicians, the State 
and the municipalities should be totally independent of the economy of 
established companies. 
The information process which takes place feeding the political process with 
regard to the potential of new technologies should be independent of the 
established power companies.  
 
4.3 Check List for Public Regulation Analysis 
In the case of implementation of radical technological changes the public 
regulation should address the following (See figure 4.1): 
(I) the energy system, i.e. energy production, distribution and 
consumptions; plants and companies, and all the circumstances and 
rules for transaction on the energy market, 
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(II) the socio strategic process, i.e. the process to secure the ability of 
society to adjust major changes in the environment. This is a primarily 
parliamentary process in which the decision makers are Parliament 
and local authorities, 
(III) international relations, i.e. the external limits of design and 
implementation of national energy policies and strategies. In the case 
of Denmark such limitations and possibilitiesmainly come from the 
European Communities, 
(IV) technical development, i.e. the development of well-proved new 
technical solutions such as new burners, new types of renewable 
energy ect.  
Within each of theses areas public regulation should include change in 
administration, organisations and institutional infrastructure as possible 
means for achieving defined political objectives. 
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Development
 
Figure 4.1: Public Regulation of Radical Technological Change in a Market 
Economy. 
 
 
The analysis of public regulation can be discussed according to the 
following check list (See figure 4.1.): 
 
Arrow 1: The establishment of economical rentability 
The establishment of economical rentability may include  
1) standard rules to secure buy and sales conditions,  
2) financial reforms such as index loans and public guaranties,  
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3) taxes and subsidies etc. 
 
Arrow 2: Organisational and institutional infrastructures 
The establishment of a suitable organisational infrastructure may include 
either changes in established organisations or help to initiate new 
organisations perhaps combined with control of the development of existing 
organisations. The establishment of institutional infrastructures may include 
both the establishment of technical infrastructures such as the public 
electricity grid and the natural gas transmission pipe line system as well as 
the establishment of long-term rules and regulation  of institutions for the 
definition of sales conditions etc. 
 
Arrow 3: The strategic political process behind new reforms 
The strategic process behind the establishment of new reforms (such as those 
mentioned above) may be influenced by the formation of committees who 
analyse and describe the material behind the political decisions. In Denmark, 
very often such committees consistof representatives for companies living by 
established technologies, and very often reports from such committees 
therefore tend to emphasize problems with new technologies (such as 
described in chapter 4.1) rather than promote them. 
 
Arrow 4: Influencing international rules and regulations 
Very often national policies and strategies are highly influenced by 
international rules and regulation. In the case of Denmark the developments 
of so-called "liberalisations" of the energy markets are initiated by the EU. 
Such international regulations will always be influenced by very intensive 
lobby possibilities from established technologies. And very often such lobby 
activities will have to be counteracted by either governments and/or lobby 
activities in favour of the new technologies. 
 
 
 
 
Arrow 5: The development of new technologies 
If houses are to be insulated, the ways of doing so must be 
available.Technical side effects must be avoided and skilled handcraft must 
be educated. If decentralized cogeneration is to be introduced new 
organisations must be able to buy the necessary equipment ect. The 
establishment of new technologies might include research, building of 
experimentation plants ect. 
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 Chapter 5 
Public Regulation cases from Denmark 
By March 1997, EU decided to reduce the CO2 emission by 10% in 2010. 
According to this decision Denmark has to reduce the CO2 emission by 25%. 
The agreement between the EU countries is in accordance with the official 
Danish Energy Policy, which has had clear CO2 reduction targets since 1990. 
Also, the Danish Energy Policy is based on a specific description of the 
technical means for implementing the reduction targets. Two important 
elements in the technical implementation are decentralized cogeneration and 
the conversion of electric heating. The public regulation of those two 
elements has already been implemented to some extent. Here the 
implementation will be described according to figure 4.1 in chapter four. 
 
 
5.1 The Danish Energy System Since 1972 
At the political level changing Danish governments have managed to 
formulate and hold on to specific objectives for the Danish energy policy in 
terms of reduction targets for CO2 emission. But at the strategic level the 
representatives of the old technologies have made the implementation 
difficult. 
 
Danish Energy Policy Objectives 
Energy security and climate change responses are major objectives for 
energy policies in Denmark as well as in many other European countries. 
During the past 20 years these objectives have been expressed through a 
number of energy plans adopted by the Danish Parliament. During the period 
from 1972 to 1990 the major objective was to become less dependent on oil 
imports. Since 1990, the main objective for Danish energy policy has been to 
reduce the CO2 emissions by 20% before the year 2005. This objective was 
expressed by the national energy plan Energy 2000 (Ministry of Energy, 
1990). Since then, the objective has been confirmed by the energy plans 
Energy 2000 - Follow-up (Ministry of Energy, 1993) and Energy 21 
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(Ministry of Environment and Energy, 1996). In March 1997, Denmark 
participated in the European Council decision to reduce CO2 emission by 
10% in 2010. According to this decision Denmark has to reduce CO2 
emission by 25% (European Council, 1997). 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s the first objective of energy security was met partly 
by energy savings and partly by an increasing oil production and by 
replacing oil with other fuels, mainly coal and natural gas. Houses were 
insulated and central heating systems were converted from oil to natural gas 
or district heating based on coal-fired cogeneration. Power stations replaced 
oil with coal, and over a period of five years the Danish electricity 
production changed from a 90% use of oil to a 95% use of coal. In the same 
period Denmark began to produce oil and natural gas in the North Sea. At 
present, Denmark has a net export of oil and natural gas. 
  
Already in the period before 1990 Danish energy policy has succeeded in 
meeting the second objective, i.e. the objective of climate change response. 
Firstly, insulation of houses and an extensive expansion in the use of 
cogeneration has lead to decreased fuel consumption for domestic heating. It 
has been achieved during a period of 20 years of economic growth during 
which the number of houses has increased. Secondly, different types of 
renewable energy have been introduced, e.g. wind power, which is now 
producing approximately 5% of the Danish electricity supply. 
 
The Danish energy policy has also had its failures. For example, the 
expansion of decentralized cogeneration was delayed for several years 
because the potential was considered too small to motivate development. 
And while large investments were made in insulation during the 1970s and 
1980s none were made in electricity savings. This resulted in an increased 
fuel consumption for electricity production while the fuel consumption for 
domestic heating decreased.  
 
Along with Parliament’s introduction of the climate change response 
objective in 1990 it was also described how this objective could be reached 
by various types of strategies. According to the government’s energy plan 
from 1990 Energy 2000 the current technology of coal-fired power 
generation has to be replaced by new technologies, such as energy 
conservation, decentralised cogeneration and renewable energy. Since 1990, 
all strategies in Parliament’s energy plans have been based on these 
principles of technology change, and consequently Parliament has decided 
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that Denmark must change its energy technologies radically - along the 
linesdefined in chapter 1. 
 
Some Actors on the Danish Energy Scene 
The Danish energy scene can be understood as a struggle between the 
established organisations, which represent the old technologies, and 
grassroots movements etc.. representing new technologies. 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  The organisation of the Danish electrical power system (The 
Jutland/Funen Case). 
 
The Electricity System 
The electrical power companies were very efficient in changing from oil to 
coal in the 1970ies, but have been resistant to new technologies such as 
renewable energy and decentralized cogeneration because of the following 
reasons. Many companies are consumer-owned with a hierarchical organi-
sation illustrated by figure 5.1. The consumers elect their representatives in 
the distribution companies (a). These representatives elect their board of 
directors (b). The board of directors elect their representatives for their 
power plant company (c). The director and the deputy director from each 
power plant are automatically members of the power plant association for 
Jutland/Funen, ELSAM (d). ELSAM is the coordination unit and the 
organisation which elaborates the political strategy for the electricity system 
in Jutland/Funen. Today ELSAM is in the process of being divided into two 
independent companies, namely a production and a transmission company. 
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It is important to notice the following features: 
(1) The elected board of directors of ELSAM has a preference for large 
centralized power plants (at present coal plants). This is the case 
because the board consists of the elected director and deputy director in 
each of the 6 large coal-based power plants. There is no independent 
administration linked to the elected board of directors.  
(2) Furthermore the administrative directors of these companies have the 
right to meet (but not to vote) at the 4-6 committee meetings every 
year. There is no independent administration linked to the elected board 
of directors. 
(3) A set of indirect election procedures squeezes out any minority group, 
and new technology is always a minority at the initial stages of its 
development. 
(4) There is a high degree of openness with regard to accountancy 
information and tariff information. Every year information regarding 
these matters is published. That way any consumer can see what other 
consumer groups and consumers in other areas pay for electricity. This 
public control makes the Danish power companies rather cost-efficient. 
Denmark has the lowest electricity prices in the EU after Sweden and 
Finland. 
(5) The Danish electricity system is consumer-owned, and it is stated by 
law that any payment for electricity has to be recycled to the electricity 
consumers. One of the results of this system  is that the Danish 
electricity system in reality has no debt. It can, for instance, lose market 
shares without risking any serious economic problems. 
 
The above mentioned features ((1), (2) and (3)) result in an organisation 
which is very conservative concerning technology, and the conserved 
technology is a centralized coal-based system. Therefore it is no wonder, that 
this type of organisation has worked against the introduction of new 
technologies such as decentralized cogeneration plants continuously since 
1975. These features ((4) and(5)) have as their result  an organisation, which 
is rather cost efficient and governable due to relative openness and financial 
ability to survive changes. All these characteristics are important, when 
analysing this organisation as a part of a process of change. One might say: 
The Danish electricity organisation cannot change itself, but it can survive in 
a process of change. 
The Natural Gas system 
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The Danish natural gas system is a rather new system, which expanded 
considerably in the late eighties and the early nineties. Its total sale on the 
Danish market was around 4.8 billion cubic metres of natural gas in 1997. 
 
Regional Gas Company
Regional Gas Company
Regional Gas Company
Regional Gas Company
Regional Gas Company
DUC DANGAS
Extraction Transmission Distribution
 
Figure 5.2:  The organization of the Danish natural gas system 
 
DUC (Danish Underground Consortium) extracts the natural gas from the 
gas deposits in the North Sea. It is owned by A.P.Møller, Shell and Texaco. 
Prices and costs are kept secret for the public, and the concession agreement 
between DUC and the Danish Government is also secret to the public. 
DANGAS buys the natural gas from DUC and sells it to 5 regional natural 
gas distribution companies. DANGAS are owned by the Danish State, and 
have a board of 9 members: 3 from private companies, 3 from the employees 
in DANGAS and 3 from the Danish Central administration. Minutes from 
meetings in the Board, and communication between DANGAS and the 
Ministry of Environment and Energy are not accessible for the public.  
 
The five regional natural gas distribution companies, which are owned by 
the municipalities, buy the natural gas from DANGAS, and sell it to the 
consumers. It must be emphasised that the Municipalities at the same time 
have responsibilities as energy planning authority. 
 
A short characterization of the Danish natural gas system is: 
- It is a rather new system, which still has a high financial debt. Especially 
the 5 regional gas companies cannot easily cope economically with an 
energy policy which would have decreasing gas markets as a result. 
-  It is a system, where there is a comparatively very low degree of 
openness towards the public. It is therefore very difficult to establish a 
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public discussion regarding the necessary public regulation of the gas 
companies. 
-  The Municipalities (and the State) have a double role as public regulator 
and owner of the natural gas system.A result of this is that the state and 
the municipalities are motivated to establish political conditions, which 
favour the natural gas project and disfavours competitors of the natural 
gas system. 
-  There are no organisational and economic links between the natural gas 
companies and the electricity companies.  
This organisation has been rather efficient in the phases, where market 
expansion was the primary target, as the Municipalities and the State are 
extremely motivated to establish conditions, which support the expansion of 
the gas market.  
 
The motivation for expansion may be described as follows: If the gas market 
expands, the public owned gas companies will have no deficit of payments, 
and it will be unnecessary to support the companies with extra payments 
from the taxpayers. Therefore the tax will not increase, and the taxpayers 
will reelect their politicians at the next election. This motivation would seem 
rather healthy from an economic point of view. Nevertheless, it has two main 
disadvantages seen from a public regulation point of view: 
 
Firstly the politicians can be captured and held as a sort of economic 
hostages by the gas companies, which will demand favourable conditions 
even after being consolidated in the market. The politicians might be in a 
situation, where they, due to the low level of openness in the natural gas 
organisation, don’t have the information needed for an efficient control of 
their companies.  
 
Secondly Denmark is  presently entering a phase where energy conservation, 
and the utilization of biomass resources are increasingly important aims of 
the energy policy. We donot need expansion but energy conservation, or 
market contraction, and we have an organisation which is designed for 
expansion. Thatis a very serious problem when designing a system of public 
regulation, which is feasible in the future. 
 
What can be learned from the Danish experience? 
(1) It has been favourable to the Danish energy policy, that the natural gas 
companies have been relatively independent of the electricity 
companies. Consequently, the natural gas distribution companies have 
collaborated with the electricity companies in their fight against 
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decentralized cogeneration. The natural gas distribution companies 
rather have had an interest in the development of a gas market for 
decentralized cogeneration. 
(2)  Almost nothing has been done in order to implement energy efficiency 
programmes, since the natural gas project was started. 
(3)  The utilization of biomass resources in the natural gas areas has been 
hampered by the natural gas project. 
The problems in (2) and (3) are generated by mixing the economy of the 
“policy making” organisations, the state and the municipalities, with the 
economy of the natural gas companies. Because of this mixture, the state and 
the municipalities have lost/weakened their political freedom to perform 
their most important task, namely to establish an open public discussion of 
the design and implementation of a long term policy/strategy. Furthermore it 
has become politically difficult to change the policy because of a system, 
where the public has very limited access to the information flows between 
the natural companies internally, as well as between these companies and the 
public administration authorities. So if an energy system is supposed to 
maintain its long term innovative capability, it is important to avoid mixing 
the economy of the energy supply companies with the “policy making “ 
organisation, the state and the municipalities. At the same time the 
innovative ideas of the public can only enter the scene, if there is a very high 
degree of openness of information builtinto the energy system.  
 
The Central Administration 
To a large extent the central administration in the Ministry of Energy has 
been influenced by the electrical power companies in the period 1975-1989. 
This influence is a part of a corporate public regulation culture. Meetings 
between the administrative directors of the power companies, natural gas 
companies and the directors of the Ministry of Energy were institutionalized 
under the term "coffee meetings". They were of considerable importance for 
the policy of the central administration. This is systematically combined with 
a tradition of establishing advisory committees mainly consisting of 
employees from the power companies and the central administration. It is 
also supported by an administration that does not have sufficient resources to 
examine specific technical questions within the area of electricity supply. 
Consequently such questions are often handed over to the employees of the 
power companies, and these employees are not in a position to give objective 
answers.  
 
In 1989 a new Minister of Energy broke this tradition by having his admini-
stration work out a new energy plan "Energy 2000", without giving specific 
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preference to the viewpoints of the power companies. At present the central 
administration is in a process of managing between a tradition of regulation 
by negotiating solely with the large power companies, and a need to introdu-
ce new cooperative procedures, where a number of proponents for the 
decentralized new green technologies take part in the planning process. The 
new energy plan Energy 21 continues the energy policy of Energy 2000, and 
describes how it is possible, by means of new decentralized green 
technologies to halve the emission of greenhouse gasses. But so far no 
decisive steps have been taken to alter the administrative procedures 
characterized by negotiations solely with the existing fossil fuel power 
companies. 
 
Parliament 
The Danish parliament is able to organize the introduction of new 
technologies - even when this is against the wishes of the power companies: 
(a) Minority political views are represented in Parliament, but not in the 
power companies. If a political party gets more than 2% of the votes, it 
gets representation in Parliament. Consequently, Parliament has many 
political parties, at present eight. This political pluralism in Parliament 
makes it difficult to conquer all the political parties. Some of the minor 
parties have no strong links to the power plant industry or the trade 
union interests linked to this industry. They are independent parties. 
Therefore, new ideas can enter the political debate.  
(b) Normally there is a very delicate balance between the right wing and 
the left wing parties in Parliament, and this sometimes makes it possible 
for the above mentioned independent political parties to get political 
influence. The Minister of Energy in 1989 came from one of these 
small parties, the Radical Liberal Party. 
(c) There is a certain openness in the administrative procedures. According 
to  law correspondence between the public administration and others is 
open to the public. This means that any person has the right to see this 
correspondence. 
 
The grass-roots organizations 
The movement against nuclear power played a very important role during 
the years 1977-1984, and was a scene of discussions, meetings, seminars, 
etc. Here many people got their introduction to and knowledge of energy 
questions. Simultaneously the organization for renewable energy played an 
important role. Among others, these organisations had close connections to 
universities and members of Parliament, and as a result specific political 
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reforms, proposed by the grass-roots organisations were implemented by 
Parliament. The characteristics of the movements are: 
(a) That they have been "unauthorized" educational scenes. 
(b) That many people who got their training within the energy field from 
these organizations, are now employed in new businesses dealing with 
conservation, cogeneration and renewable energy or employed in 
administration or the media. In these organizations they now represent 
persistent forces influencing the energy policy in their firms and in the 
public debate. 
 
Energy researches, universities, etc. 
In the period from 1975 and onwards critical reports have been published 
from the universities, advocating technological openness, making the 
introduction of energy conservation, cogeneration and renewable energy 
possible. The universities have free research funds amounting to 40% of the 
salary of each employed teacher. This gives a rather high degree of research 
independence. The researchers are not totally dependant on funds coming 
from external funds. Furthermore a Steering Committee for Renewable 
Energy was founded in the eighties, with an annual  research budget of 6 
million $ . The members of this committee were independent of the existing 
fossil fuel companies, and were proponents of the new technologies. A rather 
large amount of independent research funds for renewable energy purposes 
made it possible to establish well-documented arguments to match the 
arguments of the established power companies. 
 
 
5.2 The case of Decentralized Cogeneration 
Decentralized cogeneration is one important element of the implementation 
of the Danish energy policy objectives of CO2 emission reduction. As it is 
well known, cogeneration decreases the consumption of fossil fuels for heat 
and power by 20 - 40%, when compared with separate production of heat 
and power. Naturally the exact figure depends on the specific conditions. At 
the same time cogeneration is a technology that can be used as infrastructure 
for the implementation of increased use of wind power, biomass and 
hydrogen-based systems in a later phase. 
 
During the period 1990-1995 the DCHP (Decentralized Combined Heat and 
Power) technology had a "take-off" in Denmark. From the beginning of 
1990 to mid-1995 the installed DCHP plant capacity raised from 60 MW to 
1250 MW, which is about 15% of the total power capacity. In the 
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Jutland/Funen area the DCHP plants and wind power delivered 27% of the 
electricity in 1996 versus 1% in 1987, and 4% in 1991. 
 
This "take-off" was induced by means of the introduction of a set of 
institutional reforms in the late eighties and the early nineties facilitating the 
introduction of DCHP plants: 
- Index-regulated low interest loans in combination with municipal 
guarantees were introduced in the mid-eighties. 
- In 1988 a specific (and publicly accessible) set of rules for the pricing of 
natural gas for heating and electricity was laid down. 
- Regarding the sale of electricity from auto producers to the public grid, 
negotiated standardized rules based on a long term marginal cost was 
introduced in 1988. In December 1995 this principle was put in the 
Statute Book. 
- A set of open and common rules and administration procedures regarding 
the payment for the enforcement of the distribution network were 
introduced in 1991. 
- A governmental subsidy, 0.0167 US$/kWh cogeneration electricity sold 
to the public net, was introduced in 1993. 
 
The development of these institutional reforms was a result of a long and 
complicated political process with lots of conflicts. In the following this case 
will be described according to the theory of chapter 4: 
(a) The economy of Decentralized Heat and Power production and its 
dependence on a set of politically appointed institutional reforms 
(Arrow 1). 
(b) The Establishment of new organisations to invest in decentralized 
cogeneration (Arrow 2) 
(c) The history and character of the political conflicts which led to 
these reforms (Arrow 3). 
(d) The ongoing struggle against EU-directives to keep the Danish priority 
of decentralized cogeneration (Arrow 4). 
(e) The development that secured the existence of a well proved and well 
functioning decentralized cogeneration technology (Arrow 5). 
 
The Establishment of economical rentability (Arrow 1) 
Since 1990 more than 200 DCHP plants have been established in Denmark. 
30 of the plants (64 MW electrical capacity) are based on biomass as fuel 
and the remaining around 200 (1180 MW electrical capacity) on natural gas. 
The size of the plants vary from 0.2 MW to 60 MW electrical capacity. A 
typical plant has between 0.5 and 5 MW electrical capacity. In order to 
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understand this development, the case of Sønderholm Cogeneration Plant 
will be scrutinized: Sønderholm Cogeneration plant has an electrical 
capacity of 1 MW, and a heat capacity of 1.8 MW installed. The plant started 
production in the beginning of 1992, and ever since it has produced without 
problems.  
 
Investment  Million US$. 
Cogeneration Plant 
(Gas engine incl. hot water storage) 
 
1.73 
District heating pipe line system 1.27 
House installations 0.60 
Total 3.62 
Figure 5.3:  Investments, Sønderholm Cogeneration plant. 1 US dollar = 6 
DKK. 
 
Investment and financing 
The total investments amounted to 3.62 million US$ (See figure 5.3) similar 
to an investment per consumer of approximately 14,000 US$. The plant is a 
cooperative plant owned by 259 consumers, mainly private households. 
These consumers represent 84% of the households in the village of 
Sønderholm. The investment was financed by external credit and each 
household only had to make a symbolic payment of approximately 15 US$ 
to become a member of the cooperative.  
 
The investment of 3.62 million US$ is financed with 2.5% per annum index 
regulated loans. The index regulation is linked to the consumer price index. 
Such index regulated low interest loans were made available in the financial 
market in the mid-eighties. And in 1989 a law was introduced, saying that 
the municipality is obliged to give a public guarantee for the loan, which 
means that if the consumers cannot pay the yearly instalment, the taxpayers 
will have to pay. In reality this guarantee has no subsidy element, as the 
consumers are juridically linked to the cogeneration cooperative, and in case 
of bad economy would be obliged to pay high heating bills.  
If we compare the Sønderholm financing conditions to the financial condi-
tions of the esta-blished electricity system, it is important to be aware of the 
fact that the latter have a very high degree of consolidation, and that there is 
no taxation on the large capital of this system. I.e. that the built-in interest on 
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the expansion of this system is lower than 2.5% p.a. Therefore, the amount 
of subsidies in relation to the traditional power system is negative. In the 
case of Sønderholm, the 3.62 million US$ investment has been financed in 
such a way, that the annual payment in 1993 and 1994 was 0.26 million 
US$. 
 
Sale of electricity to the public grid 
The Sønderholm DCHP plant produces about 3.54 million kWh every year. 
In 1994 this equalled a payment of 0.2 million US$, or an average price of 
0.073 US $/kWh. This price level is composed of: 
(a) payment from the public grid, 
(b) conditions for delivery to the public grid, and  
(c) payment from the Government for low CO2 energy production. 
Rules for standardized payment from the public grid were introduced in 
1988 after a tough political fight/debate, where the power companies tried to 
lower the payment as much as possible. The rules are based on the principle 
of a long term marginal costs and include a payment for decreased need for 
transmission networks in a power system with many decentralized power 
production units. It was also assured, that the owners of a decentralized 
combined heat and power plant (DCHP) should have the right to sell 
electricity to the public grid at a price based on the principle of a long term 
avoided costs in the public electricity system. The reference system is a large 
coal fired power plant, and the transmission system linked to this is a 
centralized method of electricity production. Included in the price is the 
payment for reserve capacity for situations where the Sønderholm DCHP 
plant is out of production.  
 
In 1995 the power companies refused to follow these rules which were then 
put in the Statute Book by Parliament in December 1995. In spring 1996 this 
law was accepted by the European Union. The implementation of this 
principle has resulted in the following prices for electricity sold by the 
Sønderholm cogeneration plant to the public grid (See figure 5.4). 
 
 
 
Name Time definition Sønderholm  
production 
 
Million 
kWh/year  
Sales prices 
 
 
US$/kWh 
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High load  Monday-Friday 
-Winter 730-1200 and 17-1830. 
-Summer 730-1200 
1.24  0.083 
Middle load Monday-Friday 
-Winter 630-730, 1200-1700 and 
1830-2100 
-Summer 630-730 1200-2100 
1.34 0.060 
Low load The remaining time 0.96 0.023 
Figure 5.4:  Sales prices for electricity sold to the public grid 
 
The terms of sale are very simple and non-bureaucratic. In 1991, after a 
political fight with the power companies, agreement was reached on a 
standardized set of rules of the payment for establishment of sufficient 
transmission capacity in the electricity grid. There is no specific payment for 
reserve capacity.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned prices there is a 0.0167 US$/kWh 
payment: The so-called "CO2 10 øre" that was introduced in 1993 as a part 
of the national energy policy. This payment was given to electricity 
produced at decentralized cogeneration plants, based on natural gas as fuel, 
as a reward for low CO2 energy production. This "CO2 10 øre" was only 
given to consumer owned decentralized cogeneration plants. Not to the 
plants owned by the electricity companies. The subsidy in the case of 
Sønderholm amounts to 60,000 US$/year.  
 
Sale of heating to the consumers 
In 1994 the Sønderholm cogeneration plant produced 4.9 million kWh heat 
sold to the consumer for 411,295 US$ or in other words at an average price 
of 0.0833 US$/kWh. This price includes payment for the amortization of the 
investments in each house. An investment of 2,317 US$ in average per 
household. The marginal price in 1994 was 0.065 US$/kWh. It should be 
mentioned that in comparison the price per kWh light fuel oil in 1994 was at 
the same level. Seen from the consumers’ point of view, this type of heating 
is not cheaper than its alternative, which is light fuel oil, but the consumers 
benefit from not having to maintain and reinvest in a private fuel furnace 
storage system. Many households were close to a point where they had to 
invest in new private systems. This was avoided by paying 16.7 US$ to the 
cogeneration cooperative. 
 
Purchase of natural gas from the gas companies 
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Sønderholm cogeneration cooperative in 1994 purchased 997,711 m3 natural 
gas, for 0,318 million US$. The average price was 0.32 US$/m3 gas. In 
Denmark there is a taxation on fossil fuel utilization for heating purposes. 
Electricity has a kWh electricity tax, but not a fuel tax. Consequently gas for 
heating purposes is more expensive for Sønderholm, than gas for electricity 
purposes. In 1994 Sønderholm paid around 0.44 US$/m3 gas for heating 
purposes, and 0.15 US$/m3 gas for electricity production.  
 
The principle of dividing between heating and electricity purposes has been 
heavily discussed in Denmark, and the result should be seen as a 
consequence of a political decision more than a technical calculation. The 
main principle is that a calculation is made of how much gas would have 
been used to supply the given amount of heating from an ordinary heat 
production unit. The marginal extra amount of gas used for the cogeneration 
plant is defined as gas for electricity production. In the case of Sønderholm 
627,413 m3 was defined as gas for heating (0.44 US$/m3), and 370,298 m3 
(0.15 US$/m3) was defined as gas for electricity production. 
 
This solution is due to the fact that in 1988 a specific (and publicly open) set 
of rules for the pricing of natural gas for heating and electricity was laid 
down. It should be noted that these rules are not relatively favourable for 
natural gas-based cogeneration. In fact the large coal-based cogeneration 
units in the big cities still  have by far the lower total fossil fuel taxation, 
compared to the decentralized cogeneration units. From a taxation point of 
view the large units are in principle operating as power producing units with 
a marginal use of fossil fuel for heat production. Under these rules  
Sønderholm would have been able to buy about double the amount of natural 
gas to the low price, if it had been a coal-based cogeneration unit in a big 
city. This is just to mention that the new technology at this point has no 
relative advantage seen in relation to the conventional large coal-based 
power plants. In fact the decentralized plants here still have a negative 
subsidy, seen in relation to large coal-burning cogeneration plants of 70 - 
80,000 US$ per year. 
 
 
 
Conclusion regarding the institutional preconditions 
Figure 5.5 shows that in the year 1995 there was a small deficit, but in the 
previous year  there was a small surplus. At present the economy is in 
balance at a heat price that is competitive to the price of the alternative: 
Light fuel oil. 
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Expense category Expenses 
million US$. 
 Income category Income 
million US$. 
Natural gas heat      0,27  “CO2 10 øre”     0,06 
Nat. gas. elect.      0,05  Sale electricity     0,2 
Working expenses      0,11  Sale heat     0,41 
Amortization      0,26   
Total expenses      0,69 Total income     0,67 
Figure 5.5:  Financial balance of the Sønderholm DCHP plant 31 June 
1994-31 June 1995 
 
The Establishment of organisational infrastructure (Arrow 2) 
As described in chapter 5.1 the established electric companies showed no 
interest in building decentralized cogeneration units. On the contrary the 
expansion of this technology was seen as a threat to the possibilities of 
getting permission for building new coal fired power stations. Therefore, 
new organisations had to evolve in order to introduce this technology. 
 
In Denmark the establishment of consumers owned cooperatives is an old 
tradition which is widely spread all over the country. The power companies 
are consumer owned, district heating systems are mostly consumer owned, 
many agricultural organisations are consumer owned, etc. And in many 
towns and villages consumer owned district heating companies  already 
existed when the expansion of decentralized cogeneration started. But this 
was not the case in all places. In some towns - such as for example 
Sønderholm - new consumerowned companies had to be formed. 
 
In such places the establishment of cogeneration was typically initiated by a 
ginger group of 5-10 persons. Sometimes they were formed by existing local 
citizens groups, and sometimes this was initiated by the natural gas 
companies or consultancies ect. Also, in Sønderholm a ginger group of five 
persons was formed. 
Furthermore it is a lesson from the Danish development in general that in the 
long run houses with district heating linked to cogeneration will have 
considerably lower prices, than houses using individual oil-based heating 
systems. Nevertheless, this price argument was never used by the local 
cogeneration ginger group. They used to say that they could not promise that 
the heat would be cheaper than systems based on individual oil-burning. 
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Nevertheless this ginger group, consisting of five persons, was able to 
convince 84% of the households, that cogeneration was a good idea. 
 
The precondition for this solution was the existence of an active local ginger 
group, which was willing and able to analyse technical alternatives, 
negotiate with the electricity companies and arrange public meetings with 
the consumers within the region. Also it was possible to work out a solution, 
where the consumers had to raise less funds, than if they did not join the 
cooperative, they only had to pay 16.7 US$ to become members. Their 
alternative would have been to raise a couple of thousand US$ in order to 
maintain their own private systems. It was very cheap to become a member. 
 
The Strategic Political process behind the reforms (Arrow 3) 
It must be remembered, that cogeneration is well known in Denmark; there 
have been large cogeneration plants in towns with more than 100,000 
inhabitants since the 1930s. Before the Second World War there were also 
many decentralized cogeneration plants based on diesel as fuel. In the 
following the focus is set solely on the political process from 1973 and 
onwards, which led to the development of DCHPs in the nineties. This 
development has the following characteristics: 
 
Dansk energipolitik 1976 (Danish Ministry of Trade, 1976) i.e. Danish 
Energy Policy 1976 was the first Danish energy plan after the energy crisis 
in 1973. In this plan DCHP plants were excluded because they would 
impede an economic utilization of nuclear power-based electricity 
production. It was recognized that the potential of DCHP was considerable, 
but at the same time it was decided that this potential should not be further 
examined. Economic comparisons of nuclear power and fossil fuel 
alternatives were conducted between large coal fired plants and large nuclear 
plants. In that way the nuclear power technology, which in the seventies was 
wanted by the government and the power companies, was compared with the 
second best fossil fuel technology. The best technology, cogeneration, was 
not included in the comparisons.  
 
The government and the power companies tried to keep the DCHP 
technology off the political agenda, but they did not succeed, as different 
independent energy plans were elaborated, concluding that decentralized 
cogeneration plants could play an important role in the Danish energy 
system as an alternative to nuclear power. A group of university researchers 
participated in the public debate by elaborating an alternative energy plan in 
1976 (Hvelplund, 1976). In this plan a considerable electricity production 
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came from natural gas-based DCHPs. Nevertheless, in information 
pamphlets from the power companies, DCHPs based on natural gas were not 
even mentioned as a technological possibility in 1979. The publication from 
ELSAM called Kort fortalt om kraft/varme i.e. Cogeneration in brief 
mentioned coal-based co-generation in towns down to a size of 10,000 
inhabitants. There was no mention about the possibility of introducing 
DCHP based on natural gas. 
 
The Energiplan 1981 (Danish Ministry of Energy, 1981) was the second 
official energy plan.It relied either on large coal based or large nuclear 
power plants. The DCHP technology was described as having negligible 
potential in the energy system. The official policy and the policy of the 
power companies continued to be that of keeping DCHPs off the political 
agenda. A group of university researchers wrote Energi for fremtiden, i.e. 
Energy for the Future as an alternative to Energiplan 1981. Here DCHP 
plants were introduced in towns with a size of down to 200 inhabitants 
amounting to a generating capacity of around 2000 MW. 
 
In 1984 the Danish parliament decided to abolish nuclear power from the 
energy plans, and the Ministry of Energy established an advisory committee, 
that was to examine the possibilities for DCHP. This group had 13 members 
from the central administration, the power companies and the natural gas 
companies. 
 
At the same time a natural gas-based DCHP pilot plant was built by the 
power companies in a village called Ullerslev. The first results from this 
pilot plant were very pessimistic. Among other problems there was an engine 
stop for 3 months in 1985. The power companies expressed deep pessimism 
regarding the technical and economic performance of this plant. 
 
In 1987 a final report from the above-mentioned advisory committee 
estimated the maximum potential for DCHP in Denmark to be 450 MW 
electrical capacity. The total electricity production from such plants was 
estimated to be only 6% of the electricity supply. The message to the 
politicians was, that DCHP was interesting, but of minor interest for the total 
energy system. This message (450 MW DCHP capacity) was included as 
official energy policy until 1989.  
 
Also in 1987 there was a public discussion regarding the payment of the 
electricity sold from DCHP plants to the public grid. As a result of this 
public discussion, where the power companies tried to keep the price down 
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as much as possible, fixed rules for payments were established, based on the 
principle of a long term avoided cost. The reference system was a 350 MW 
coal-based power plant.  
 
In 1988 the authorities still calculated with a price between 1,266 and 1,583 
US$/kW per installed kW electrical capacity DCHP plants. This had the 
effect that in the public debate, cogeneration continued to be regarded as a 
very expensive alternative to the large coal based power plants. In 1988 the 
official policy still had it that decentralized cogeneration could only supply 
around 450 MW electrical capacity. 
 
In 1990 a 3.5 MW electricity and 5.6 MW heat cogeneration plant were 
founded in a small town called Dronninglund, mainly because Dronninglund 
had a coal fired furnace, which should be closed according to heat plan 
procedures. The price per installed MW electrical capacity was 833 US$, or 
even lower than the kW price of a large coal fired power plant.  
 
At the same time a new Minister of Energy, J. Bilgrav Nielsen, member of a 
small rather green liberal party, had been appointed. He was an experienced 
politician and concerned about the ecological problems linked to the energy 
productions. He organized the elaboration of a new energy plan Energy 
2000. This plan had as its goals a 20% reduction of the CO2 emission and a 
15% reduction of the energy consumption within the period 1988-2005. In 
this plan a DCHP plant capacity of 1500 MW was planned for the year 2000. 
 
In 1995 the power companies refused to continue to pay a price based on the 
principle of a long term marginal costs for the electricity bought from 
DCHPs. After fruitless negotiations with the power companies, the Minister 
of Environment and Energy decided to propose a law enforcing the power 
companies to pay according to the long term marginal cost principle. 
 
This law was passed by Parliament in December 1995, and was notified in 
the European Union in May 1996. In 1996 a new electricity law was passed 
by Parliament, giving electricity from DCHPs and renewable energy sources 
first priority in the Danish electricity system. 
 
Influencing International Rules and Regulation (Arrow 4) 
In February 1997 a new EU directive on electricity trade was accepted by the 
EU Council of Ministers. The declared aim of this directive is to establish 
more competition between the power companies at the same time as 
environmental goals are pursued. The directive among others aims has  
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opening the electricity market by ensuring that consumers are allowed to buy 
from different producers in the market to an increasing degree. The directive 
will be implemented during a period of 6 years, starting from February 1999.  
 
Concurrently with the implementation of this directive, there is a tendency in 
Northern Europe to establishan overcapacity with regard to power capacity. 
Together with the above-mentioned directive this might result in a situation 
with periods of electricity market prices equalling the short term marginal 
costs plus a profit. This might result in prices which in periods could stay at 
4-5 US cents pr. kWh. At the same time the large power companies have an 
interest in pushing the new decentralized cogeneration and renewable 
technologies off the market. 
 
As mentioned before, the Danish cogeneration units by lawget a payment for 
electricity sold to the public grid, which equals the long term marginal costs 
at a large coal fired power plant. In 1995 and 1996 the question arose, to 
what extent it was possible to defend the Danish energy policy, especially 
with regard to cogeneration and renewable energy. The danger was that the 
companies behind these “new” technologies could not survive in a market 
environment, where the external environmental costs were not included in 
the market prices, and where the market prices in periods would be close to 
the short term marginal costs, due to a situation with overcapacity. 
 
As a consequence of this discussion a Danish “liberalization” law was 
introduced and accepted by the Danish parliament in mid 1996. This law as 
good as  copied the content of the coming EU directive mentioned above, 
and represents an opening of the Danish electricity market, so that 
consumers with an annual consumption of more than 100 GWh are allowed 
to buy electricity where they want to. At the same time the Danish law gives 
preference to renewable energy and cogeneration, so that these “green“ 
technologies are protected against direct competition from the large fossil 
fuel power plants. The law states that the Danish electricity distribution 
companies and the Danish consumers are obliged to buy each their 
proportion of the electricity produced in renewable energy and cogeneration 
units. 
 
After a longer period of analysis and discussion between the Danish 
negotiators and the EU, the EU accepted the content of the Danish 
“liberalization” law in mid 1997. Therefore this law is now in effect. It 
seems clear that new technologies organised by comparatively new and 
small organisations cannot be exposed to “free” competition with the old 
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power companies which have huge accumulated capital, and at the time 
overcapacity. It is therefore important to establish market constructions, 
which both establish competition in order to keep costs down, and protection 
of newcomers and their green technologies. It was necessary that the Danish 
government worked actively in order to establish this protection of the 
“green technologies”, and in this case it seems as if this work succeeded.  
 
The development of new technologies (Arrow 5) 
The first natural gas DCHP pilot plant was built in the early eighties by 
power and natural gas companies, which had not really any interest in the 
development of such a technology. It was placed in the village of Ullerslev 
on the island of Fyn and was always called the Ullerslev plant. The first 
results of the Ullerslev plant were very pessimistic, and the plant itself was 
very expensive. Therefore the power and natural gas companies expressed 
deep pessimism regarding the technical and economical performance of this 
plant and of such technology in general. For several years this pessimism 
was used wherever decentralized cogeneration was proposed. For example 
the city council of Aalborg rejected this technology because of the  prices of 
heat in Ullerslev.  
 
For almost 10 years this technology was regarded expensive and not stable 
until two new stations were built in Northern Jutland in 1990 (Dronninglund 
and Nørager). Those two stations were based on technological experiences in 
Germany and the Netherlands, where many decentralized cogeneration units 
had been put into production without the problems of Ullerslev. 
Cogeneration units were then imported and installed in Denmark. The 
special Danish energy taxes on fuels for heat production and the Danish 
tradition for heat savings initiated that Danish companies developed special 
heat equipment for the imported engines in order to secure no waste of heat. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The case of decentralized cogeneration is an example of how a new 
technology has to run through a number of political phases before it can be 
implemented. The following classical methods of resistance against a new 
technology can be mentioned: 
 
The early introduction phase (1975-1982): 
Here the "it does not exist" argument was used. The representatives of the 
“old technologies” tried to exclude the new technology from the political 
agenda. Decentralized cogeneration was  simply ignored in any technical 
report published by the companies. This strategy had considerable success 
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until about 1980. This can be regarded as a typical first phase opposition 
strategy. 
 
The late introduction and pilot plant phase (1982-1989): 
First the "it does not work" argument was used. The technical reliability of 
decentralized cogeneration was underestimated. This was exemplified in the 
mid-eighties with the Ullerslev pilot plant administrated by the power 
companies. Then the "it is too expensive" argument was used. The economy 
was underestimated. This was done with success until 1990, when the first 
DCHP plant was built at a price 40% lower than the official "planning price" 
in 1989. Finally the "maybe it exists, works and is economical, but it is only 
of minor importance" argument was used. The potential was underestimated. 
This strategy was successful until 1989. The way of doing it was to conquer 
the political process and assure that governmental advisory committee only 
had members from the central administration and the power companies. 
 
Implementation phase: 
In the implementation phase the "it does not work in an energy system" 
argument was used. Technical problems linked to the adjustment of the new 
technology to the total electricity system was exaggerated. This was, and is 
done by means of the newly established "Integrated Resource Planning" 
procedures where it is argued that the new technology, DCHPs, lead to 
problems with excess electricity during the winter. 
 
 
To a large extent the way of resisting the new technology has been to 
conquer parts of the political planning process. Amongst others by supplying 
members to official advisory committees, which prevented unbiased 
information from entering the decision scene of Parliament and by getting a 
monopoly on the newly established "Integrated Resource Planning" 
procedures. 
 
It may be concluded, that proponents of a specific technology, in this case 
coal fired power plants, should not be the only members of governmental 
advisory committees or have  monopolies on integrated resource planning 
procedures. The advisory committees should also have members who are 
proponents for the new technologies, and who are independent of the 
established technologies. Integrated resource planning procedures should 
include organisations which are proponents of DCHPs, renewable energy 
and energy conservation technologies. If such precautions are not taken, the 
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information reaching Parliament will be biased, and unfeasible for sound 
political decisions.  
 
 
Figure 5.6:  The economy of Sønderholm Cogeneration Plant 
The total picture of the establishment of economical rentability of 
Sønderholm cogeneration plant is illustrated in figure 5.6. The figure shows 
that cogeneration plants are extremely vulnerable to financial conditions at 
four levels: 
(I)  The prices  of purchase for natural gas, 
(II)  the prices for heating sold,  
(III)  the prices for sold electricity, and 
(IV) the financial conditions for amortization of the loans. 
 
At all levels bad institutional conditions may stop the growth of the 
cogeneration. The established institutional conditions are shown in the 
circles. Every condition has been necessary for the successful development 
of the cogeneration in Denmark. The economy of the cogeneration plant has 
now reached a level, where it can compete with the alternative: individual 
heating systems based on light fuel oil. 
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In addition to this the Danish tradition for consumer owned cooperatives-, 
and the active ginger group was necessary. The active ginger group was 
necessary because Sønderholm was among the first small cogeneration 
plants which also needed investment in a water pipe distribution system 
(1.27 million US$). Now that the technology has become common the need 
for an active ginger group has diminished.   
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Figure 5.7:  Growth in DCHP capacity, and the establishment of the 
financial institutional preconditions at the implementation level 
 
 
Figure 5.7 is a summary of the establishment of a number of institutional 
preconditions at the implementation level for the Danish development of 
DCHP capacity since 1987.  
Furthermore it has to be recognized that a set of non-financial preconditions 
at the implementation level also have to be present. Among the preconditions 
we will sum up the following: 
- In the initial phases it is a big advantage that there is an infrastructure of 
district heating systems distributed all over the country. This was the case 
in Denmark, and these consumer-owned district heating cooperatives 
represent the backbone of the Danish decentralized cogeneration develop-
ment. These systems are easier to implement, than systems like 
Sønderholm, where it is necessary to invest 1.27 million US$ in pipelines 
for distribution of hot water.  
- In Denmark there is an institutional public heat planning procedure 
which, by political decision, in 1990 enforced coal-burning district 
heating systems to find a substitute for coal as a fuel. As these systems 
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had to change fuel, they were looking for new technological possibilities. 
The DCHP technology was at hand, and therefore it was implemented in 
the former coal based district heating cooperatives. 
- Active district heating cooperatives with a rather active democratic 
decision procedure have made it possible to make decisions regarding the 
introduction of DCHP systems. 
- A high tax on coal, oil, gas, and electricity makes heat rather expensive. 
This increases the public interest for issues of heating. 
 
The "breakthrough" for DCHP was initiated despite the resistance from the 
central administration and the electrical power companies. The initiative 
evolved from the public debate established by grass-roots groups, 
researchers at universities and Members of Parliament. Future energy policy 
must realize, that innovation comes from firms, groups of people and 
individuals who are independent of the existing fossil fuel supply 
companies. 
 
In general it may be concluded that the specific Danish conditions in the 
power companies, in the central administration, in Parliament and in the 
grass-roots movements made it possible to introduce reforms against the will 
of the power companies and initially also against the will of the central 
administration. 
 
The situation of the energy scene does not seem to have changed with 
respect to the resistance to change coming from the power companies. 
Therefore the specific Danish conclusion is that public regulation has to give 
an important role to groups and people outside the influence of the large 
fossil fuel supply companies.  
 
 
5.3 The Case of Conversion of Electric Heating 
It is planned that the Danish energy policy objective of CO2 emission 
reduction be reached by the introduction of a wide range of technological 
changes. Decentralized cogeneration is one element, and a switch from 
electric heating to central heating is another small but an important element. 
In 1992, around 152,000, out of approximately 3 million, Danish households 
were heated by electric heating as the main source. The net heat demands 
were estimated to 8,6 PJ/year which were approximately 1,4 % of the total 
energy consumption. But since electricity production in Denmark is based on 
coal-fired power stations the electric heating needed 2,8% of the primary 
energy uses and resulted in 3,8% of the total CO2 emission. 
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Heat 
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% 
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CO2 
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ton/year 
Electric heating 
(Based on coal) 
56 10 62 40 154 14,6 
Natural gas  
(Residential burner) 
56 - 56 80 70 4,0 
District heating  
(Partly cogeneration) 
56 25 70 133 53 4,0 
Oil  
(Residential burner) 
56 - 56 75 75 5,5 
Straw/Wood  
and solar collector 
56 - 45 70 64 0,0 
Figure 5.8: Fuel consumption and CO2 emission from electric heating 
compared with relevant alternative technologies 
 
In figure 5.8 electric heating is compared with a number of relevant 
alternative house heating technologies. The comparison is made for an 
average, electrically heated household with a heat demand of 56 GJ/year 
equal to approximately 15.500 kWh/year. Fuel consumptions are calculated 
with the shown grid losses and production efficiencies which are typical for 
Danish heating equipment. And CO2 emission is calculated on the basis of 
the following emission factors: coal, 95 kg/GJ; gas oil, 74 kg/GJ and natural 
gas, 56.9 kg/GJ (Ministry of the Environment, 1994). 
In the table electric heating is compared with:  
- natural gas in residential burners, which is a relevant alternative for 
approximately 39% of the electrically heated houses located in areas within 
the Danish natural gas grid;  
- district heating which is relevant for 23% of the houses within district 
heating areas;  
- and residential burners using either gas oil or straw/wood, which is relevant 
for the remaining 38% of the houses located outside both natural gas and 
district heating areas. All of these technologies may be supplemented with 
solar collectors which typically produce approximately 20% of the house 
heating (hot water during summer time). This possibility is shown for the 
case of straw/wood burners. In the case of district heating a mixture 
representing the average Danish district heating system in 1995 is assumed. 
In this year approximately 72% of the heat was produced in cogeneration, 
and the mixture of fuel was more or less an even division between coal and 
natural gas. 
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Figure 5.8 shows how both fuel consumption and CO2 emission are much 
higher for electric heating than for any of the shown alternative technologies. 
This is primarily due to the electricity being produced from coal. If the 
electricity was produced from wind power, hydro power or nuclear power, 
the CO2 emission would have been zero. Meanwhile it must be emphasized 
that coal is the relevant alternative in Denmark where 84% of the electricity 
production in 1995 was based on coal. It also counts for the fifteen EU 
countries as a whole since more than 30% of the European electricity 
production is based on coal. 
 
 Buildings 
 
 
 
Number 
Heat  
demand 
 
 
TJ/year 
Fuel  
consumption 
 
 
PJ/year 
CO2 
emission 
 
Thousand 
ton/year 
Saved 
electricity  
capacity 
 
MW 
Electric heating 151,847 8,572 23.57 2,239 - 
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Figure 5.9:  Potential fuel savings and CO2 reductions from a 100% 
conversion of electric heating. 
 
In figure 5.9 the result of the implementation of a 100% conversion from 
electric heating in Denmark is calculated. In areas without natural gas and 
district heating a 50% conversion to oil burners and a 50% conversion to 
straw/wood burners supplemented with solar collectors is assumed. As seen 
in figure 5.9 the fuel savings and the reduction in CO2 emission are 
substantial. The fuel consumption is cut down by 57% and the CO2 emission 
is cut down by 76%. And it should be emphasized that the end-use house 
heating is exactly the same. 
 
Compared with 1995, the conversion from electric heating has a potential of 
reducing the Danish CO2 emission by almost 3% from 58.7 to 57,0 million 
tons/year. At the same time a capacity of 780 MW electric power may be 
saved. 
 
The establishment of economical rentability (Arrow 1) 
The public regulation of the conversion of electric heating is a multi-
instrumental regulation. It consists of both general taxes, standard and 
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specific subsidies, governmental information campaigns and local 
administrative free help and follow-up.  
 
Green energy taxes 
The conversion is already helped considerably by high energy taxes in 
Denmark in general, and in particular when the government decided on a 
green tax reform in 1993. According to this reform, taxes on electricity for 
electric heating are increased every year in the period from 1993 (0,335 
DKK/kWh) to 1998 (0,495 DKK/kWh). Also, coal and oil are taxed. 
 
Standard subsidies for renewable energy 
Denmark has had subsidies for renewable energy for many years. The 
principles of these subsidies are set to help renewable technologies in an 
introduction period until the technologies have been developed so much that 
subsidies are no longer needed. Typically the subsidies have covered 30% of 
the construction costs. Anno 1997 status is the following: the subsidy to 
wind power has ceased since this technology is now feasible; the subsidy to 
solar collectors and biomass is approximately 20% (depending on the 
efficiency) and the subsidy to heat pumps is 15%. 
 
Subsidies specifically for conversion of electric heating 
In June 1995, Parliament decided to grant a subsidy specifically for the 
conversion of electric heating. This subsidy is given to the installation of a 
new central heating system and the amount is 5000 DKK plus 60 DKK/m2 
heated areal. Moreover, an environmental bonus is granted if the conversion 
is into a heat pump or renewable energy such as a biomass burner or a small 
heat producing wind turbine. Additionally, a bonus is granted if the burner is 
supplemented with a solar collector. 
 
The establishment of organisational infrastructures (Arrow 2)  
Compared with the expansion of production capacity the conversion of 
electric heating is a good example of the need for organisational change. As 
described in chapter 1 the construction of a new coal fired power station may 
be handled by power companies and consultancy companies, while the 
conversion of electric heating needs the active involvement of a number of 
various households and industries at  consumer level. In Demark those “new 
investors” were partly addressed by  an information campaign and partly by 
the follow-up of local energy advisory offices. 
 
A general information campaign 
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In January 1996, the Danish Energy Agency mailed a letter to each 
individual household in the areas without district heating and natural gas. 
The letter informed the households of the reasons why the government 
wanted this policy of fuels for heating and of technical alternatives and the 
possibilities of subsidies.  
 
Free advise from 16 local energy offices 
The Danish Energy Agency also made an agreement with the corporation of 
energy offices in Denmark, which encompasses a number of private member 
organisations based on the promotion of renewable energy and environment. 
This organisation has built up a number of offices in which the citizens can 
seek information on renewable energy. Typically the offices have a network 
of local craftsmen who can instal renewable energy. In the above mentioned 
information letter from the Energy Agency the households were told to 
contact one of the sixteen offices situated around the country to have free 
additional information and help to fill in forms to apply for subsidies. 
 
The strategic political process behind new reforms (Arrow 3) 
In the case of the conversion of electric heating the design of public 
regulation must be seen in the light of a number of various barriers. The 
public regulation must address many private households and industries with 
a very small awareness on electricity consumption. 
Thus, this is an example of a radical technological change such as described 
in chapter 1. Moreover, the following barriers must be dealt with: 
- Electric heating has very low residential construction costs, while the 
alternatives include a very expensive central heating system together with 
heavy investments in wood- or natural gas burners. Electric heating has 
high running costs compared with the alternatives, but still the conversion 
needs a very high residential investment to be paid here and now. 
- Many people feel that the solution of electric heating was recommended 
to them by the government, when they built their houses. This is not quite 
true, but for a period after the first oil crisis electric heating was 
considered a better solution than residential oil burners, because the 
power stations had replaced oil with coal. The main reason for installing 
electric heating systems in many new houses in the 1970s was the low 
investment costs. Still, this solution was approved  by many 
municipalities. 
- From the residents’ point of view the solution of electric heating is clean 
and extremely easy to maintain. There is no oil or wood or dirty 
machinery in the houses. And there is no need for maintenance.  
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- Typically there is no room for a burner and fuelstorage as many houses 
were equipped with electric heating or they have been adapted to it and 
used the space for something else. This means that the conversion will 
result in less space. 
Altogether, the conversion of electric heating is facing serious barriers. 
However, these barriers are most serious in areas without district heating and 
natural gas. In district heating areas the conversion costs are relatively low, 
the demand for space is low, and the technology is relatively clean and easy 
to maintain. The conversion in areas of natural gas is a bit more difficult but 
still more uncomplicated than conversion in the rest of the areas. Moreover, 
the alternative technologies (natural gas burners and district heating) are 
present and well organised in district heating and gas companies, and the 
conversion is more feasible in these areas.  
 
Therefore, the conversion from electric heating in areas of district heating 
and natural gas (but not in the other areas) was  part of the plan, when the 
Danish Government formed Energy 2000 - Follow up in 1993. However, this 
plan ran into difficulties arising from the interest of the old technologies. 
 
After the decision on the Energy 2000 - Follow up the Danish Energy 
Agency formed a group of actors including the utilities to design the 
implementation. One of the major issues of discussion was who should 
benefit from the saved capacity cost of the power stations. The power 
stations in Denmark are owned by the electricity consumers and have all 
been paid for as a part of the electricity prices during the past many years. 
Consequently, there is hardly any net debt in the electricity sector in 
Denmark. Furthermore, the electricity companies are allowed to raise 
electricity prices in advance in order to finance future power stations. And 
such new stations were about to be built. Therefore, the Danish Energy 
Agency argued that the electricity companies should repay an amount equal 
to the saved capacity costs to the households that had converted and in this 
way saved capacity costs. 
 
The utilities protested strongly against this policy. They had no interest in 
converting electric heating as they would lose customers and they would lose 
arguments for permission to construct new power stations. The latter was 
probably the strongest concern. Precisely at that time one of the two big 
power company corporations in Denmark (ELSAM) had just had severe 
difficulties in  finding arguments for two new power stations and the other 
big corporation (Elkraft) was just in the process of applying for another new 
station in Copenhagen. 
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The discussion went on for a long time without any result. Therefore the 
government changed implementation strategy when the latest energy plan 
Energy 21 was drawn up in 1996. It was decided to start the conversion in 
the areas without district heating and natural gas and to finance the 
investments partly by a new fund for electric savings within households and 
public buildings. This fund was formed owing to a law passed in 1996 along 
with Energy 21 and the fund was financed by a small tax on every kWh 
electricity sold. It is still the plan to continue with the conversion later on, 
also in  areas with natural gas and district heating. 
 
Influencing international rules and regulations (Arrow 4) 
So far the Danish policy has not been directly influenced by international 
rules and regulations. 
 
The development of new technologies (Arrow 5) 
One alternative to electrical heating in areas outside district heating and 
natural gas is conversion to traditional individual oil boilers. This technology 
is well-proved and would not have called for specific technology 
development initiatives. But other alternatives are better suitable seen in the 
light of the Danish objectives of CO2 reductions. Such alternatives are solar 
collectors and wood stoves, which technologies have been developed during 
a long period of time with special technology development initiatives. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The Danish Energy Agency mailed 60,000 letters and approximately 6,000 
households responded, of those 1294 had converted by the middle of 1997 
while a number of other households are in the process of converting. In 
November 1996, the first 832 applications for subsidies were analysed 
(Energi- og Miljødata, 1996). Many different households were represented, 
but the typical house has the following characteristics: 
- Detached house or farm building 
- Built around 1910 
- Heated area of approximately 165 m2 
- Electricity consumption of 110 kWh/m2 equal to 18.000 - 19.000 
kWh/year 
- Well insulated and with two layers of panesin the windows 
- Electric heating is supplemented by a fireplace or a wood burning stove 
The households mainly chose wood burners (74%) or oil burners (22%), 
only very few chose the heat pump and 22% chose to supplement the burner 
with a solar collector. 
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There are central records of the applications for subsidies, but those records 
do not include all the construction costs in detail. Based on an interview with 
one of the local energy offices that assist the households in the conversion 
the following may be said (Bender, 1997): investments in solar collectors 
and wood burners are very homogeneous. The costs are almost always 
32,000 DKK for solar collectors and 55,000 DKK for wood burners 
(excluding VAT) which include installation and a chimney, etc. Central 
heating systems do cost between 10,000 and 65,000 DKK with an average of 
32,000 DKK. The very large variation is due to differences in size, self-
installation and tolerance of whether the pipes should be hidden in the walls 
or not. The cost of oil burners also varies a great deal. This is due to the fact 
that old burners are very easy to find because many households have just 
joined district heating systems, and consequently a lot of burners are 
available. Moreover, some households have a chimney for the existing 
fireplace and therefore investments in oil burners are typically very low. The 
average is here estimated to 15,000 DKK. 
In figure 5.10 the total investments of the first 1294 conversion cases are 
calculated to 104 million DKK. In the same table it is calculated that sooner 
or later this investment should entail savings of an investment in some 6.6 
MW coal fired power stations equal to 53 million DKK. Therefore, the net 
investment may be calculated at 51 million DKK. Based on the investigation 
of imports and employment consequences of different energy technologies in 
Denmark mentioned in chapter 2 those effects have also been calculated. 
Figure 5.10 shows that the net effects on imports are very small (7 million 
DKK), whereas the job creation has been as big as 149 additional jobs. 
 
 Share 
 
 
Per 
cent 
Units 
 
 
 
Number 
Costs 
pr. unit 
 
DKK 
pr. unit 
Costs 
 
 
Million 
DKK 
Import 
share 
 
 
Per cent 
Imports 
 
 
Million 
DKK 
jobs/inv.
 
Man 
year pr. 
million 
Jobs 
 
 
Man 
year 
Central heating 
Oil burner 
Wood burner 
Solar Collector 
Heat Pump 
-------------- 
Sum 
 
100 
22 
74 
22 
4 
 
 
1294 
285 
957 
285 
52 
 
28.000 
15.000 
55.000 
32.000 
30.000 
 
36 
4 
53 
9 
2 
----- 
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11 
18 
25 
22 
13 
 
4 
8 
13 
2 
0 
----- 
27 
 
2.8 
2.7 
2.0 
2.2 
2.8 
 
 
 
101 
11 
106 
20 
6 
----- 
244 
Power station  6.6 MW 8.000 - 53 37 - 20 1,8 - 95 
Difference    51  7  149 
Figure 5.10:  Constructions Costs, Imports and Jobs from the first 1294 
conversion cases 
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The estimations of the running cost in figure 5.11 show that even though the 
total costs will raise imports will be saved in the future and some additional 
permanent 10 jobs have been created. The net import during construction (7 
million DKK) is paid back over a period of 10 years (684,000 DKK/year), 
and after this period the net effect on the balance of payment will be 
positive. Furthermore, a minor rise in coal prices will have a considerably 
positive effect on the reimbursement period. 
 
If the electric heating conversion is continued in the areas outside natural gas 
and district heating the 150 jobs already created will be able to raise to an 
amount of 430 permanent jobs directed from the running costs of the burners 
and the fuels. Additional jobs may be created within the areas of natural gas 
and district heating. Maybe the most important feature is that such positive 
employment effects can be created together with a CO2 reduction and 
without having negative net effects on the balance of payment. 
 Running 
costs 
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Fuels 
 
 
TJ/-
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DKK/-
GJ 
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1000 
DKK/y 
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Man 
year 
Oil 
Wood 
Coal 
Burners 
Solar + 
centr.heat 
-------------- 
Sum 
 
 
 
4 
 
1 
 
20 
73 
3 
 
 
44 
45 
13 
 
 
880 
3285 
39 
2280 
 
450 
-------- 
6934 
85 
21 
90 
15 
 
15 
748 
690 
35 
342 
 
68 
-------- 
1883 
0.3 
2.1 
0.2 
2.5 
 
2.5 
 
 
0.3 
7.0 
0.0 
5.7 
 
1.1 
------- 
14.1 
Coal 
Power station 
---------------- 
Sum 
 
3 
199  
13 
2587 
1590 
--------- 
4177 
90 
15 
2328 
239 
-------- 
2567 
0.2 
2.5 
0.5 
4.0 
-------- 
4.5 
Difference    2757  - 684  9.6 
Figure 5.11:  Running Costs, Imports and Jobs from the first 1294 conver-
sion cases. 
 
The case of electric heating conversion in Denmark illustrates a number of 
general problems, when radical technological changes are needed in order to 
implement political objectives of CO2 reduction. Also the case gives an 
example of how public regulation can deal with those problems. 
 
Firstly, it must be realized that the implementation of CO2 reduction policies 
is characterized by a change in technology that calls not only for minor 
technical modifications, but also for large organisational changes, which will 
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often comprise the establishment of completely new organisations. 
Secondly, the existing institutional setup is strongly influenced by the 
existing organisations linked closely to the old technologies that will no 
longer be needed in the near future.  
 
Therefore, implementation of the new technologies is a challenge to public 
regulation.  On the one hand it must be expected that it will meet resistance 
from the old technologies. On the other, it must initiate establishment of new 
institutional setups. In the case of conversion of electric heating in Denmark 
these barriers have so far been overcome partly by introducing a mixture of 
numerous differentiated and multipurpose public regulation instruments, and 
partly by changing strategy in terms of implementing “least-feasible” 
conversions first in order to avoid conflicts with the old technologies. 
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National and international environmental objectives call for new 
technologies, new organisations and institutions within the energy area. In 
such a situation, “Feasibility Studies and Public Regulation” must include a 
detailed description of the relationship between the present economic, social 
and institutional situation and the situation in which the new technologies 
are supposed to function in the future. 
 
This book outlines a systematic methodology for “Feasibility Studies and 
Public Regulation” in a situation, where technological and institutional 
changes are needed. 
 
The method is based on the experience of implementing ambitious 
economic, social and environmental objectives in the Danish Energy Policy. 
A number of examples from Denmark is included . 
 
In the present form the book addresses the subject in a general manner. For 
educational purposes it has to be combined with case material. It has been 
written for a training programme for Energy Experts in the Baltic States, the 
PROCEED programme, and is used in combination with case material 
developed in each country. The PROCEED pro-gramme is financed by the 
Nordic Council of Ministers. 
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